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This dissertation consists of three essays that explore economic issues on 
information security and risk management. In the first essay, we develop an economic 
mechanism which coordinates security strategies of Service Providers (SPs). SPs are best 
positioned to safeguard the Internet. However, they generally do not have incentives to 
take such a responsibility in the distributed computing environment. The proposed 
certification mechanism induces SPs to voluntarily accept the liability of Internet 
security. SPs who take the liability signal their capability in conducting secure computing 
and benefit from such recognition. We use a game-theoretic model to examine SPs’ 
incentives and the social welfare. Our results show that the certification mechanism can 
generate a more secure Internet communication environment.  
The second essay studies the impact of cyberinsurance and alternative risk 
management solutions on firms’ information security strategies. In the existing literature, 
cyberinsurance has been proposed as a solution to transfer information risks and reduce 
security spending. However, we show that cyberinsurance by itself is deficient in 
addressing the overinvestment issue. We find that the joint use of cyberinsurance and risk 
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pooling arrangement optimizes firms’ security investment. In the case with a large 
number of firms, we show that firms will invest at the socially optimal level. 
The third essay examines the information role of vendors’ patching strategies. 
Patching after software release has become an important stage in the software 
development cycle. In the presence of quality uncertainty, we show that vendors can 
leverage the patch release times to signal the quality of their software products. We 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Information security and risk management have drawn increasing attention due to 
the recent explosions of viruses, worms, Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS) attacks, 
phishing, pharming and other malicious activities. The economics of information security 
and risk management has recently become a thriving and fast-moving research area. It 
has been recognized that information security problems can be understood in terms of 
economic concepts. Economic solutions in addition to technology innovations are able to 
address various security issues. In this dissertation, we use the tools and concepts of game 
theory and microeconomic theory to examine different security issues. 
The growing proliferation of malware is raising doubts about the Internet’s future. 
Security has become a priority investment in public and private organizations; security 
technologies are being continually refined and more and more information security 
personnel hired. Nevertheless, the attacks and malicious activities in general are still 
rising in scope and viciousness in a global scale. An important reason is that SPs who are 
best positioned to safeguard the Internet lack incentives to take the responsibility for 
security. In Chapter 2, we propose a certification mechanism to induce SPs to voluntarily 
accept the liability for security. By taking the liability, SPs can signal their capability in 
conducting secure network communications and benefit from such recognition. We use a 
game-theoretic model to examine SPs’ incentive and the social welfare. We show that the 
proposed mechanism can improve Internet security. This study provides economic 
rationale for reengineering the organizational structure of the Internet. 
Recently the security-related spending is growing fast at the corporate level. 
Existing literature on security investment has primarily focused on the issue of 
underinvestment, while the issue of overinvestment in security has not been sufficiently 
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studied. In Chapter 3, we discuss multiple causes of security overinvestment and explore 
how firms can adopt risk management solutions to optimize their security spending. We 
show that risk pooling arrangement (RPA) can outperform a mature cyberinsurance 
market in addressing overinvestment issue. The key insight is that firms can leverage the 
moral hazard associated with RPA, known as the moral hazard in team, to mitigate the 
overinvestment incentive and destructive competition. Moreover, we illustrate that firms 
benefit by adopting both RPA and commercial cyberinsurance. In the case with a large 
number of firms, the joint use of RPA and commercial insurance induces firms to invest 
at the socially optimal level. This research generates important managerial implications 
regarding security risk management and policy implications regarding the development 
of mutual insurance for cybersecurity.  
Software vulnerabilities or flaws are an important reason for security breaches. 
Patching after software release has become an integrated stage in the software 
development cycle. As information asymmetry exists in the software market, the strategic 
aspects of vendors’ patching decisions need to be studies. In chapter 3, we investigate the 
information role of vendors’ patching strategies. In the presence of quality uncertainty, 
we show that vendors can leverage the patch release time to signal the quality of their 
software products. In a dynamic setting, we define a new belief profile and identify two 
types of separating equilibria. The study deepens the understanding on strategic aspects 
of vendors patching policy. 
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Chapter 2: An Economic Mechanism for Better Internet Security 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Security problems, including spam and malware, plague the Internet to the point 
of distracting from productive use of the network. Technology is waging an admirable 
battle against these problems, but its solutions may not be sufficient by themselves to 
provide adequately secure environments. Fundamental issues with the design and 
interconnection policies of the Internet infrastructure contribute to the vulnerability to 
generation and dissemination of new attacks. Instead of relying exclusively on 
technology solutions in the context of the current policy framework, we consider the 
implication of a possible altered framework that could relate interconnection to security. 
Policy changes, rather than protocol changes, are considered. 
The Internet can be viewed as an economic system besides being a technology-
based environment. Such a view focuses attention on the interdependence and incentives 
of participating economic agents, who include service providers, users, and purveyors of 
malware and spam. It has been recognized that Internet security problems can be 
understood in terms of economic concepts, such as externality, liability, and moral hazard 
(Varian, 2000; Kunreuther and Heal, 2003; Lichtman and Posner 2004; Anderson and 
Moore 2006). While this is a useful insight, we need to go further and explore whether 
economic concepts can help us frame a pragmatic proposal to alleviate security problems 
by influencing some of the economic factors that govern the actions and interdependence 
of the participants.  Such a proposal may also draw from public policy and law which 
have also dealt with the need to control socially harmful actions by some of the members 
of various communities. 
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In our proposal we recognize certain features of the Internet. As distinct from the 
legal approach to controlling crime, the information infrastructure has no clear 
delineation of jurisdiction, or corresponding enforcement powers. To illustrate by an 
analogy, with traditional criminal behavior such as bank theft, there are national laws that 
govern this behavior and associated police actions. Assigning the liability to the 
perpetrators and expecting the police to apprehend them are considered reasonable ways 
to reduce crime. Prosecution of a crime is focused on the perpetrator, precisely because 
the scope of jurisdiction, and the powers of investigation, enforcement, verification and 
punishment are well defined and can be vested into formal institutions and policies. With 
the Internet, the analogy is to view the crackers as the liable entity to be apprehended and 
punished. The analogy breaks down since the cracker could be in a foreign jurisdiction 
that does not recognize the laws of the country that suffered the attack of the crackers. Of 
course, this assumes that the crackers could be identified which could be impossible.  
The natural assignment of liability to the perpetrators is not a practical way of 
looking at the Internet security problem. Instead we propose to consider the service 
provider (SP) as the entity to assume liability for the actions of its customers. Service 
providers are businesses or organizations who provide Internet access and related 
services to their customers or users, such as Yahoo!, AOL, universities, government 
agencies and large companies. Since the SP itself does not carry out any attack, but only 
transports traffic from customers some of who may be crackers, it appears unreasonable 
to place blame on SPs. It is common practice for public policy and law to make 
allowances for aspects of practical deployment of enforcement policies while formulating 
them. Accordingly, it may be seen that controls are sometimes applied at those nodes in 
organizational or community hierarchies which have the highest ability to influence the 
targeted criminal activity. 
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It would also be reasonable to assume that SPs would not voluntarily accept such 
a status since they would not accept a liability for a criminal action that they did not 
commit. Thus we need to show that a case can be made for SPs to voluntarily accept 
liability. In other words, we need to show that SPs may find it in their interest to 
subscribe to a framework that makes them responsible for security problems initiated by 
their customers. We denote the SPs that subscribe to the proposed policy framework as 
being “certified”. 
To induce a SP to accept liability and thus to become certified, we propose that all 
of the certified SPs’ traffic once identified be carried to other certified SP without any 
additional reduction in performance for inbound filtering. In contrast, traffic from a non-
certified SP may be blocked or significantly slowed down by certified SPs for carefully 
screening. Thus customers of a certified SP would obtain better service quality compared 
with customers of a non-certified SP and should be willing to pay a higher price for the 
service. However, the value to customers of a certified SP depends, in general, on how 
many other SPs decide to become certified. Since certification brings with it the liability 
obligation, a SP has both the issue of how many other SPs, it believes, will choose 
certification and how capable it is in monitoring and detecting possible traffic from its 
customers that could result in costly penalties. The latter decision is a one based on 
private information that the SP possesses but the former information is a guess or a 
conjecture.  
This is especially complex since each SP is facing the same conjectural decision 
and the result could easily lead to inconsistent results where SPs make conjectures about 
the composition of the certified group which turns out to be incorrect. Is there a 
possibility of a solution where the conjecture or expectation of the SP are consistent and 
creates a subset of SPs that form a certified group and thus a viable and more secure 
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environment within the Internet? It is possible but this depends on the number of capable 
SPs and the number of users who could financially appreciate the benefits of a more 
secure Internet environment. So the challenge of voluntarily creating a collection of 
certified SPs with their associated customers is in the end an empirical issue. That is, we 
need to validate the conceptual framework by conducting experimental investigations 
into whether certification can attain sufficient critical mass to generate significant 
improvements for the certified providers and their customers, and that such gains are not 
offset by partial degradation of connectivity to the non-certified environment. 
To summarize, our approach is to assign liability to those SPs who in turn 
voluntarily accept it. For a SP that has accepted responsibility there is a strong incentive 
to monitor and also to write contracts with customers that hold them responsible both 
financially and possibly in term of reputation. Even without explicit liability, the 
approach induces that SPs monitor the behavior of their computing environments to 
ensure that it is not used explicitly or otherwise to cause damage.  
2.1.1 Security Practices 
Before investigating SPs’ incentives to accept the liability for security, we need to 
examine SPs’ choices of security practices. We classify technologies and methods for 
SPs to control security into two categories, regulative practices and protective practices.  
We refer to the set of technologies and methods for SPs to minimize the 
possibility of sending out malicious traffic as regulative practices, for example, the 
technologies used to monitor users and filter outgoing traffic. We refer to the set of 
technologies and methods for SPs to minimize the possibility of receiving malicious 
traffic as protective practices, for example, the technologies used to filter incoming 
traffic. Figure 2.1 demonstrates the impact of protective and regulative practices on 




Regulative practices are more effective/efficient1 than protective practices for 
three reasons. First, it is easier for SPs to perform regulative practices than protective 
practices because of information advantages. SPs have direct relationship with their 
customers and are able to acquire more information about their customers. For example, a 
SP can monitor its customers and analyze abnormal communication patterns to identify 
malicious users. It can contact customers to detect third-party hacking. In contrast, it is 
very difficult for SPs to determine malicious traffic originating from other networks. 
Second, SPs have administrative powers. They can slow down a connection, quarantine 
zombie computers, or directly disconnect crackers, spammers or phishers. Finally, 
regulative practices alleviate network congestion by dropping malicious traffic before it 
passes through the Internet. 
                                                 
1 In this paper, we use both effectiveness and efficiency to characterize security practices. Effectiveness 
represents the probability/ability of security practices to successfully identify malicious activities. 
Efficiency represents the investment/cost of security practices. Thus, “A is more effective than B” means 
that A can identify malicious activities with a higher probability than B if the same amount of money is 
invested in A and B. “A is more efficient than B” means that less investment is needed by A than B in order 
to achieve the same level of effectiveness. In essence, they are equivalent. 
   Controlled traffic     Uncontrolled traffic
(a) Protective practices                               (b) Regulative practices 
Figure 2.1 Internet Traffic with Protective Practices vs. Regulative Practices 
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2.1.2 Certification Mechanism 
Currently, not all SPs are willing to deploy regulative practices to examine the 
traffic they are forwarding. SPs either assume no responsibility and hence take no 
security action or only deploy protective practices to improve local security. By assigning 
liability, our certification mechanism can induce the deployment of regulative practices 
within the certified network to improve overall Internet security.  
The certification mechanism includes three kinds of players, the certification 
provider, SPs and customers. They interact in two stages as follows. 
In the first stage—the subscription stage 
• The certification provider determines a subscription fee for certification 
services; 
• SPs voluntarily subscribe to certification services;  
• The certification provider issues certificates to subscribed SPs and maintains a 
list of certified SPs.  
In the second stage—the communication stage 
• SPs invest in security practices, determine customers’ Internet access fees and 
initiate network services;  
• Certified SPs are required to compensate other certified SPs for damage 
caused by malicious traffic originating from their networks; 
• Certified SPs are required to compensate their own customers for damage 
caused by malicious traffic regardless of its source. 
Certificates serve as informative signals in this mechanism. Certification status of 
a SP is publicly observable. For example, the certification provider maintains a list of 
certified SPs. Customers can learn a SP’s commitment and capability by observing 
whether it is on the list. However, only certified SPs can read the certificates and 
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accurately distinguish whether the traffic comes from a certified SP or a non-certified SP 
in the communication process. Put it differently, even though all SPs know the 
certification status of other SPs, only certified SPs can verify the source of inbound 
traffic by implementing the certification technology. Non-certified SPs may identify the 
source of the traffic by commonly available source IP address information in packets. 
However, they cannot prove the origin or guarantee its accuracy. Certification 
technologies must guarantee authentication and non-repudiation. That is, certified SPs are 
confident of identifying the source of the traffic; and certified SPs cannot deny the traffic 
that they send out or claim receiving traffic that they have never received. Candidate 
technologies which fulfill these characteristics of certification include digital signatures. 
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The certification provider plays a significant role in controlling Internet security 
in our mechanism. It motivates all certified SPs to watch the traffic sent to the Internet. It 
moderates and arbitrates disputes among SPs about the occurrence of security breaches 
and the subsequent compensation. In addition, the certified provider can share breach 
information among certified SPs, helping them prevent new breaches. For example, once 
compensation is transferred between certified SPs, the certified provider will solicit the 
detailed breach information and publicize it within the “certified network”.  
We use a game-theoretic model to examine SPs’ incentive and evaluate the 
efficiency of the certification mechanism. In addition to the traditional screening and 
signaling mechanism, our model also incorporates network externality which is an 
important feature of Internet communications. In traditional screening and signaling 
games, choices by players generally depend only on their own inherent characteristics. In 
our model, a SP’s choice depends not only on its own characteristics but also the 
expected choices of other SPs. For example, when a SP decides whether to subscribe to 
certification services, it will also consider other SPs’ expected subscription decisions, i.e., 
the expected numbers of SPs in the certified network and the non-certified network. As a 
result, when the certification provider makes the decision on separating SPs, it should 
consider the interdependency among SPs’ decisions.  
The organization of this chapter is as follows. In Section 2.2, we review recent 
literature on information security. In Section 2.3, we outline a game-theoretic model and 
derive important conditions. In Section 2.4, we analyze strategies of various players and 
derive equilibria. Section 2.5 examines the efficiency (i.e. system surplus) of the 
proposed mechanism. Section 2.6 concludes the chapter with a discussion of 
implementation issues. 
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2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
As information security has been extensively studied from a technological 
perspective, there is an emerging body of literature exploring security issues from an 
economic perspective. Anderson and Moore (2006) indicate that incentive misalignment 
significantly undermines information security and emphasize that incentives should be 
considered in security design. Varian (2000) also points out that besides identifying weak 
points and indicating who might be in position to fix them, a security analysis should 
further examine incentives of those who are responsible for security. Liability should be 
assigned to those who are best positioned to improve security. Lichtman and Posner 
(2004) propose that holding ISPs liable or partially liable can help improve the efficiency 
of security protection2. Parameswaran et al. (2007) specifically point out that SPs who 
provide direct Internet access to end users should protect their users and safeguard the 
overall network. This paper shares the view that SPs should be responsible for security 
and introduces incentives for them to achieve this goal. 
This paper also connects to research exploring the optimal security investment. 
Gordon and Loeb (2002) develop an economic model to study the optimal investment in 
information security. Huang et al. (2006) further extend Gordon and Loeb’s paper (2002) 
and consider a security threat scenario where attacks from multiple agents occur 
simultaneously. Cavusoglu et al. (2004b) use a game-theoretical model to analyze the 
impact of IT security investment on manual monitoring, firewall and IDS configurations 
considering the difference in costs. All these papers ignore the interdependency between 
individuals and organizations on the Internet and take a firm’ risks as exogenously given. 
The Internet risks and the incidents of security breaches are highly interdependent 
due to the global connectivity of the Internet. Kunreuther and Heal (2003) demonstrate 
                                                 
2 We thank Dr. Rahul Telang for providing this helpful reference. 
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that firms fail to coordinate their security investment in the presence of interdependent 
risks. An entity will significantly underinvest if it believes that there are other weak 
nodes in the network, leading to an inefficient equilibrium. Ogut et al. (2005) show that 
risk interdependency lowers firms’ incentive to invest in security protection and buying 
insurance coverage. These papers capture the nature of Internet security and exhibit its 
impact on firms’ decisions and market equilibria. However, eliminating the source of 
insecurity is generally not considered.  
Researchers have started to examine the impact of various security mechanisms 
and policies on Internet security. Kannan and Telang (2005) compare the social 
efficiency between a CERT-type mechanism and a market-based mechanism on 
vulnerability disclosure. August and Tunca (2006a) compare the impact of different 
security policies on individual user’s incentive to patch software taking account of 
patching costs and negative network externalities. Huang et al. (2007) discuss the 
weaknesses of existing solutions to DDoS attacks and then propose two approaches to 
counter such attacks. In this study, we propose a novel economic mechanism, a 
certification mechanism, to enhance collaboration among SPs and eliminate sources of 
malicious activities.  
2.3 MODEL 
2.3.1 Model Setup 
We consider a classical network with N SPs. Each SP serves n customers. For 
notational simplicity, we use 2M Nn=  to represent the network effect. A SP is either of 
high-type or low-type. Users of high-type SPs generate less malicious traffic than those 
of low-type SPs. Let q  denotes the ratio of the potential malicious traffic volume to the 
regular traffic volume originating from a SP’s network. { , }h lq q q∈ , where h lq q< . The 
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distribution of SPs’ types is exogenously given and is common knowledge. Pr( )hq q δ= = . 
A customer benefits from communicating with other customers and loses from receiving 
malicious traffic. A customer’s average valuation of a unit of regular traffic is V. We 
normalize the expected volume of unidirectional Internet data stream between two 
customers to 1. The expected damage per unit of malicious traffic on customers is v. SPs 
charge a flat fee, p, for Internet access services to each customer. In the network without 
any security practices, a customer’s expected utility can be expressed as 
2 ( (1 ) )h lNnV Nnv q q pδ δ− + − − . 
SPs can deploy two types of security practices, protective practices and regulative 
practices. To successfully identify a unit of malicious traffic with probability [0,1]x∈  
from inbound (outbound) traffic, a SP needs to invest 1( )C x ( 2 ( )C x ) in protective 
practices (regulative practices). 1( ) 0C x′ > , 1( ) 0C x′′ > , 2 ( ) 0C x′ > , 2 ( ) 0C x′′ >  where x 
characterizes the effectiveness of security practices. 1( )C x  and 2 ( )C x  are the same for all 
SPs. For simplicity, we assume that the probability for regular traffic to be erroneously 
marked and discarded is 0. In addition, we assume 1 2( ) ( )C x C x> , 1 2( ) ( )C x C x′ ′>  for every 
[0,1]x∈ . That is, the investment in regulative practices is more efficient than that of 
protective practices. We use quadratic investment cost functions. ( ) 211 2C x xα=  and 
( ) 212 2C x xβ= , where α β> . We assume that the effectiveness of security practices is 
observable to their customers. 
The certification provider charges a subscription fee, t, for certification services to 
each SP. Certified SPs must compensate other certified SPs at the level of s per unit of 
malicious traffic originating from their networks. They also compensate their customers 
at the level of s per unit of malicious traffic regardless of its source. The timeline of the 





 The certification mechanism is designed to induce SPs to control 
malicious traffic. Such a mechanism is valuable when the following conditions hold. 
First, 2 lV vq> (Condition 1). That is, the damage created by malicious traffic from low-
type SPs, although significant, does not offset the overall value of the communication. 
Second, lMvqα ≥ (Condition 2). Condition 2 says that the efficiency of protective 
practices investment is low. Third, ( )212 0l lMV Mvq Mvqα− + ≤  (Condition 3). Condition 3 
ensures that no SP will let in any traffic from other SPs if all SPs are of low-type and 
hence the Internet data stream can go nowhere. It implies that the damage caused by low-
type SPs is so drastic that the Internet will collapse if all SPs are of low-type. It seems 
that Condition 1 and Condition 3 contradict each other. However, they together 
characterize the reality of Internet communication. On the one hand, SPs generate 
positive values from communicating with one another. On the other hand, once a SP 
knows that another SP has a large number of malicious and incompetent customers, it 
will completely block inbound traffic from that SP. For example, email originating from 
regions with high rates of spam such as China, Russia, and South Korea has been blocked 
by many providers. Finally, we require that the compensation per unit of malicious traffic 
be equal to the damage that a unit of malicious traffic causes. That is, s v= (Condition 4). 
SPs decide whether 
to subscribe to 
certification services 
SPs invest in 
security practices 




T=0 T=1 T=2 T=3 T=4 T=5
The certification 
provider sets a 
subscription fee 
Figure 2.3: The Timing of the Dynamic Game 
Subscription stage Communication stage
Certified SPs make 
compensation  
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It is fair to let SPs be completely accountable for the loss entailed by forwarding 
malicious traffic. 
2.4 ANALYSIS 
In this section, we analyze SPs’ and the certification provider’s strategies and 
derive equilibria. We consider two cases: (i) a benchmark case without the certification 
mechanism, and (ii) the case with the certification mechanism. In the second case, we 
focus on the symmetric Perfect Bayesian Equilibria where SPs with the same types will 
adopt the same strategies. There are potentially three mutually exclusive and collectively 
exhaustive symmetric equilibrium outcomes, (1) a separating outcome that only high-
type SPs subscribe to certification services; (2) a pooling outcome that all SPs subscribe 
to certification services; and (3) a pooling outcome that no SP subscribes to certification 
services. We use backward induction to derive the equilibria. We first analyze the 
following strategies of SPs in each outcome:  
• the subscription strategy: whether to subscribe to certification services;  
• the blocking strategy: whether to completely block the inbound traffic;  
• the pricing strategy: how much to price their services;  
• the investment strategy: whether to invest in protective and/or regulative 
practices and how much to invest.  
The above strategies are controlled by the subscription fee charged by the 
certification provider. We then investigate the certification provider's pricing strategy and 
derive the equilibrium based on the certification provider’s profitability.  
2.4.1 Benchmark Case 
In the benchmark case, we analyze strategies of SPs and identify the equilibrium 
without the regulation of certification services. Since protective practices have a direct 
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impact on SP’s quality of service, a SP has incentive to invest in protective practices to 
improve its profitability. In contrast, SPs will not deploy regulative practices because it 
only benefits the recipient customers who are mostly in other SPs’ networks. Therefore, a 
customer’s willingness to pay to SP i is  
( ) [ ]2 1ib ibu NnV Nnv x E q= − −             (2.1) 
Here b refers to the benchmark case. The first term of equation (2.1) is a 
customer’s expected benefit from communicating with other Internet users. The second 
term of equation (2.1) is a customer’s expected loss caused by malicious traffic. ibx  
represents the effectiveness of SP i’s protective practices. A customer’s expected value is 
independent of her SP’s type, but is affected by distribution of SPs’ types in the network. 
Thus we drop subscript i. The price that SPs charge is equal to the customers’ willingness 
to pay b bp u= . We state a SP’s profit as follows:  
( ) ( ) [ ] ( )1 12 1b b b b bp n C x MV Mv x E q C xπ = − = − − −        (2.2) 
Proposition 2.1 shows the SP’s strategies, profit and the system surplus3 in the 
benchmark case. 
Proposition 2.1:  In the equilibrium of the benchmark case, 
(1) a SP only invests in protective practices and the level of the investment is 
( )212 [ ]MvE qα ; 
(2)a SP charges [ ] [ ]( )212NnV NnvE q NnvE q nα− +  for Internet access services to its 
customers; 
(3) a SP’s profit is [ ] [ ]( )2122MV MvE q MvE qα− + ; 
(4) the system surplus is [ ] [ ]( )( )2122MV MvE q MvE q Nα− +  
Proof: Using FOC, we get { }1min [ ],1bx MvE qα∗ = . From Condition 2, 1 [ ]bx MvE qα∗ = . 
Substituting bx∗  into Equation (2.1), we obtain the optimal price. Substituting bx∗  into 
                                                 
3 The system surplus comprises ISPs’ profit and customers’ utilities. 
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Equation (2.2), we obtain a SP’s profit. The system surplus is equal to the total profit of 
SPs.            Q.E.D. 
No SP will invest in the more efficient regulative practices to control the 
malicious traffic when they are autonomous due to the public good nature of regulative 
practices. Although all SPs suffer from rampant malicious activities via the Internet, none 
has incentive to eliminate the harmful code at its origin to benefit others. They only spend 
money to protect themselves. 
2.4.2 The Network with the Certification Mechanism 
We now analyze the case where the certification mechanism is introduced. SPs 
decide whether to subscribe to certification services considering the benefit and the cost 
of following the rules specified by the certification provider. If they subscribe to 
certification services, they have to pay a subscription fee and compensate for the loss 
caused by malicious traffic that they pass to their customers or other certified SPs. On the 
other hand, they can charge a higher price to their customers and solicit compensation 
whenever they are hit by malicious traffic from other certified SPs.  
2.4.2.1 Separating Outcome 
We first analyze SPs’ strategies in the separating outcome. Certified SPs have 
incentives to invest in regulative practices to control the outbound traffic due to their 
accountability. However, they have no incentive to control the inbound traffic from other 
certified SPs since they are fully insured from Condition 4.4 Regarding inbound traffic 
from non-certified SPs, certified SPs can choose whether to completely block it or not. If 
they let in such traffic, they need to control the inbound traffic by deploying protective 
practices. SPs adjust the price based on the expected quality of service which they can 
                                                 
4 For the traffic transmitted within a SP’s network, the SP does not have to use protective technology to 
examine the traffic again at the receiver side 
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provide to their customers. Lemma 2.1 gives the optimal blocking, pricing, investment 
strategies and profit of a certified SP in such a separating outcome. 
Lemma 2.1 In the separating outcome, the optimal strategies of a certified SP of type iq  
are as follows: 
(1) it completely blocks inbound traffic from non-certified SPs; 
(2) it only invests in regulative practices and the level of the investment is  
{ }( )21 12 min 1, hMv qββ δ ; 
(3) it  charges V Nn VNnδ +  for Internet access services to its customers; 
(4) its profit is  { }( ) { }( )21 1 121 min 1, min 1,h i hMV MV Mvq Mv q Mv q tβ βδ δ δ β δ+ − − − −  
If a low-type SP subscribes to certification services, it has to invest more in 
regulative practices than a high-type SP does because it has more potential malicious 
traffic originating from its network. As a result, the profit of a certified low-type SP is 
lower than that of a certified high-type SP. This result is critical for the certification 
provider to be able to exclude low-type SPs from certification services using the 
subscription fee.  
If a SP does not obtain a certificate, its strategy is similar to a SP in the 
benchmark case. They are not responsible for malicious traffic from their networks and 
hence have no incentive to prevent malicious traffic from being sent out. They will only 
invest in protective practices for their own customers. Lemma 2.2 gives a non-certified 
SP's optimal strategies. 
Lemma 2.2 In the separating outcome, a non-certified SP's strategies are as follows: 
 (1) it only invests in protective practices and the level of  investment is  ( )( )212 1lMvqα δ− ; 
(2) it charges ( ) [ ] ( )( ) { }22 31 11 1 min 1,l h hNnV NnV NnvE q N n vq Nnv q Mvqα βδ δ δ δ+ − − + − +  
for Internet access services to its customers; 
(3) its profit is  ( ) [ ] ( )( ) { }21 121 1 min 1,l h hVM MV MvE q Mvq Mv q Mvqα βδ δ δ δ+ − − + − +  
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Certified SPs generate positive externality by deploying regulative practices, such 
as detecting the malicious users, filtering outbound malicious traffic and eliminating 
sources of malicious activities. Non-certified SPs receive less malicious traffic from 
certified SPs and directly benefit from certified SPs’ regulative practices to the level of 
{ }1min 1,h hMv q Mvqβδ δ . In addition, non-certified SPs indirectly benefit from certified 
SPs’ investment. They can save by having to invest in protective practices only at the 
level of ( )( )212 1lMvqα δ− , unlike [ ]( )
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2 MvE qα  in the benchmark case.  
Corollary 2.1 Certified SPs can charge a higher price than non-certified SPs. 
Corollary 2.1 insures that SPs benefit from possessing certificates and are willing 
to subscribe to certification services. In the separating outcome, the Internet is partially 
separated into two parts, certified networks and non-certified networks. In certified 
networks, certified SPs can block the unprofitable communication from low-type SPs and 
can collaborate with other certified SPs to implement more efficient security practices. 
Consequently, they cooperatively maintain a better communication environment for their 
customers. Even though certified SPs must shoulder the cost of malicious activities, they 
may still benefit from subscribing to certification services if the subscription fee is 
appropriately priced. 
The subscription fee charged by the certification provider plays an important role 
in supporting the separating outcome that only high-type SPs subscribe to certification 
services: it must be high enough so as to intimidate low-type SPs from mimicking high-
type SPs, but not too high to frustrate high-type SPs from subscribing to certification 
services.  
Lemma 2.3 When  hMvqβ δ≥  , there exists a range of subscription fees, t, all of which 
support the separating outcome. The optimal subscription fee for certification services to 
induce separating outcome is  ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )2 21 12 22 1 1 1l l hMV Mvq Mvq Mvqα βδ δ δ δ− + − − − −  . 
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 hMvqβ δ≥  is used to ensure that certified SPs with different types make different 
profit and hence guarantees that the certification provider can charge a fee to induce the 
separating outcome. For each β , there exists a continuum of fees which support the 
separating outcome. 
2.4.2.2 Pooling Outcome: If All SPs Get Certified 
If all SPs subscribe to certification services, they will all invest in regulative 
practices to control outbound traffic and they do not need to deploy protective practices 
to filter inbound traffic from certified SPs. Lemma 2.4 gives certified SPs' optimal 
strategies in the pooling outcome. 
Lemma 2.4 In the pooling outcome where all SPs are certified, the optimal strategies of a 
certified SP of type iq   are as follows: 
(1) it completely blocks the inbound traffic from non-certified SPs if there is any; 
(2) it only  invests in regulative practices and the level of investment is { }1min 1, iMvqβ ; 
(3) it charges 2VNn  to its customers for Internet access services; 
(4) its profit is { }( ) { }( )21 1 122 1 min 1, min 1,i i iVM Mv Mvq q Mvq tβ ββ− − − −   
In this case, non-certified networks diminish, leaving only certified networks. All 
SPs take the responsibility of security and focus on the relatively more efficient 
regulative practices instead of protective practices. Lemma 2.5 gives the optimal 
subscription fee that the certification provider can charge to induce the pooling outcome. 
Lemma 2.5 There exists a range of subscription fees, t, all of which support the pooling 
outcome. The optimal fee for the certification provider to induce pooling outcome is  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )









h l l l h l
h h h l
h
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If a SP does not subscribe to certification services, its outbound traffic is blocked 
by certified SPs. Although a SP must pay for certification services and subsequently be 
financially responsible for the malicious traffic from its network, it still has an incentive 
to subscribe to certification services for two reasons. First, by subscribing to certification 
services, a SP stays in a bigger network and provides more extensive and secure 
communication services to its customer. Secondly, it is able to concentrate on the more 
efficient regulative practices. 
In the pooling outcome where no SP subscribes to certification services, SPs' 
pricing and investment strategies are the same as those in the benchmark case. Since the 
certification provider makes zero profit, it always prefers to the other pooling outcome. In 
the rest of the paper, the pooling outcome refers to the pooling outcome where all SPs 
subscribe. 
2.4.2.3 The Certification Provider's Profit 
The certification provider’s revenue comes from certification fees. Such a 
potential business will survive only when there is justifiable profit. For a for-profit 
certification provider, Proposition 2 characterizes the certification provider’s strategies.  
Proposition 2.2: The certification provider induces the pooling equilibrium if 
(1) hMvqβ δ≤ , or (2) h hMvq Mvqδ β< ≤  and 1 12 3 0h lvq vq V+ − < ; the certification provider 
induces the separating equilibrium when the proportion of high-type SPs is higher than 
δ  if (1) hMvqβ > , or (2) h hMvq Mvqδ β< ≤  and 1 12 3 0h lvq vq V+ − > .  
There are two countervailing forces which affect the certification provider’s 
preference to the pooling equilibrium. They are the network effect and the inferior nature 
of low-type SPs. On the one hand, the certification provider wants to have as many SPs 
as possible to subscribe to its services. On the other hand, it has to lower the certification 
fee to induce the low-types to participate (as corllorary 2.1 shows). The efficiency of the 
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regulative practice investment and the level of damage caused by malicious traffic 
moderate the tradeoff. When regulative practices are very efficient (i.e., hMvqβ δ≤ ), low-
type SPs are as good as high-type SPs in controlling outbound traffic. The certification 
provider is willing to serve both high-type and low-type SPs. The certification 
mechanism only has a pooling equilibrium. When the regulative practice investment is 
rather efficient (i.e., h hMvq Mvqδ β< ≤ ), the level of damage caused by malicious traffic 
is important. Specifically, when the damage caused by malicious traffic is relatively low 
(i.e., 1 12 3 0h lvq vq V+ − < ), the network effect dominates the inferior nature of low-type 
SPs. The certification provider prefers to serve low-type SPs since the certification 
provider can charge subscription fee to more SPs and this fee could be higher due to the 
network effect. However, if the damage caused by malicious traffic is high (i.e., 
1 1
2 3 0h lvq vq V+ − > ), the certification provider wants to exclude low-type SPs when the 
proportion of high-type SPs is high enough. Low-type SPs spend more in controlling 
outbound traffic and can only afford a lower fee compared with high-type SPs. Thus, the 
certification provider prefers to only serve high-type SPs. When the regulative practice 
investment is not very efficient (i.e., hMvqβ > ), the disadvantage for low-type SPs in 
controlling outbound traffic becomes more severe and demand an even lower 
subscription fee. Consequently, the certification provider will give up the market for low-
type SPs.  
2.5 SYSTEM SURPLUS 
In the pooling equilibrium, all SPs invest in more efficient security practices, 
regulative practices, instead of protective practices. We conclude that the pooling 
equilibrium always generates a higher system surplus than the benchmark case. 
Proposition 2.3 further shows that the pooling equilibrium is also more efficient than the 
separating equilibrium and hence it is socially optimal.  
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Proposition 2.3: The pooling equilibrium is socially optimal. 
Although blocking the inbound traffic from low-type SPs could be an optimal 
strategy for SPs (as Condition 3 specifies), it is not socially optimal. The magnitude of 
damage caused by low-type SPs cannot completely eliminate the benefit that low-type 
SPs bring to network communications (corresponding to Condition 2). Network effect 
always dominates the adverse consequence caused by low-type SPs. Therefore, we 
conclude that a global network should be maintained.  
Social optimality can be achieved when the certification provider is a non-profit 
organization who always maximizes the system surplus. However, a for-profit 
certification provider may prefer the separating outcome in certain conditions. 
Proposition 2.4 shows that, though suboptimal, the separating equilibrium can still 
generate a higher system surplus than the benchmark case. 
Proposition 2.4: There is a δ  above which the separating equilibrium generates a higher 
system surplus than in the benchmark case. 
The network effect, which plays a prominent role in network communications, is 
unavoidably undermined by the blocking and separation induced by the certification 
mechanism. However, when the proportion of high-type SPs is high and enough SPs 
subscribe to certification services, efficiency can still be improved given that regulative 
practices are widely deployed.  
Corollary 2.2: The certification mechanism induces a higher system surplus when (1) 
hMvqβ >   or (2) h hMvq Mvqδ β< ≤  and 1 12 3 0h lvq vq V+ − < .  
When one of the conditions hold, the certification provider always induces the 
pooling equilibrium which is the socially optimal outcome.   
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2.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This research examines the Internet architecture and addresses Internet security 
issues from an economic perspective. We propose a certification mechanism to induce 
SPs to exert collective effort and improve Internet security. More specifically, the 
proposed mechanism provides certified SPs incentives to deploy regulative practices. We 
use a game-theoretic model to examine the efficiency of our mechanism. The results 
show that our mechanism can increase the system surplus. By providing SPs with 
appropriate incentives, our mechanism can create a better communication environment 
over the Internet.  
The challenging issue is, who should be the certification provider? The 
certification provider can be a non-profit institution, such as Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). ICANN is a central authority with limited 
power in the essentially decentralized and neutral global network. However, its functions 
are restricted to running the addressing system, giving out blocks of unique identifiers to 
countries and private registries. Commentators have suggested ICANN should play an 
enhanced role in governing the unregulated Internet. By providing certification services, 
it introduces a soft regulation to the Internet, characterized by the fact that participation is 
voluntary, and participants choose their actions based on self-interest. The certification 
provider can also be a for-profit organization. The previous analysis examines the 
certification provider's profit and discusses its impact on system surplus. 
This paper characterizes the effectiveness of security practices using a single 
parameter, x, representing the false negative5. In most control settings, both false 
negatives and false positives are used to describe the effectiveness of security practices. 
                                                 
5 A false negative is the polar opposite of a false positive. A false negative occurs when the security 
protection fails to detect a malicious activity. For example, a virus scanner fails to detect a virus in an 
infected file or an email filter fails to detect a spam email.  
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Since regulative practices generally outperform protective practices in reducing errors, 
the analysis and results considering both false positive and false negative will be similar. 
In addition to the subscription fee, certified SPs also incur the overhead when they 
verify the certification status of incoming packets. The overhead has the similar impact 
on SPs’ payoff as the subscription fee. When the overhead or the subscription fee 
increases, SPs have less incentive to subscribe to certification services. However, it must 
be recognized that without the certification mechanism, SPs have to carefully filter all 
incoming traffic. The increasingly sophisticated attacks make it more difficult and costly 
to detect malicious activities from incoming traffic. The proposed certification 
mechanism has the advantage of avoiding the difficulty of handling incoming malicious 
traffic. SPs can effectively manage the cost by shifting the focus from identifying 
malicious incoming traffic to verifying the certification status of incoming traffic. Thus, 
the overhead will not be a barrier to the implementation of the certification mechanism. 
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Chapter 3: Security Overinvestment and Risk Pooling 
Arrangement 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Information security has become a major concern for public and private 
organizations. Studies indicate that security-related spending is growing fast. According 
to the annual CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey 2006 (Gordon et al. 2007), 
firms with annual sales under $10 million spent an average of $1,349 per employee on 
computer security in 2006, a 210% increase over 2005, and firms with annual sales 
between 10 million and $99 million spent an average of $461 per employee on computer 
security, a 327% increase over 2005. In academia, information security has drawn a 
tremendous amount of attention. Researchers have addressed information security from 
technical perspectives (e.g., Muralidhar et al. 1999; Sarathy and Muralidhar 2002; Garfinkel 
et al. 2002), economic perspectives (e.g., Gordon and Loeb 2002; 2006; Gal-Or and Ghose 
2005; Cavusoglu et al. 2004; 2005; Kannan and Telang 2005; Ghose and Rajan 2006), 
and organizational perspectives (e.g. Loch et al. 1992; Straub and Welke 1998; Gattiker 
and Kelley 1999; Tanaka et al. 2005). A central research question is how firms can 
manage security expenditure in an effective and efficient way.  
Existing literature on information security mainly focuses on the underinvestment 
issue (e.g., Anderson 2001; Kunreuther and Heal 2003; Ogut et al. 2005), while the 
overinvestment issue has not received adequate attention. It is worth noticing that firms’ 
security investment may exceed, rather than fall behind, the optimal level in many cases. 
For instance, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (SOX) has dramatically boosted firms’ 
spending on security. However, companies largely find that the costs of compliance 
exceed the benefits. A study by Oversight (Oversight 2006) indicates that 37% of 
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financial executives say SOX compliance created a cost burden that suppresses stock 
prices (up from 33% in 2004). A Symantec study investigates the efficiency of IT risk 
management programs that firms maintain and the levels of IT risks they experience. The 
report summarizes that some organizations are addressing IT risks through 
overinvestment (Symantec 2007). Although firms’ security may not be sufficient overall, 
redundant resource allocation and excessive investment still exist in certain security 
areas. In this study, we focus on the overinvestment issue. 
There are many reasons for the overinvestment in security. First, security 
investment may create competitive advantages, which drive firms to invest aggressively. 
For example, Dynes et al. (2005) found that business customers deem security investment 
to be a qualifier when evaluating partners. Further, the number of security incidents a 
firm has affects investors’ confidence, making it more difficult for the firm to compete 
with its rivals for future capital investments (Campbell et al. 2003). Therefore, firms may 
heavily invest in security to maintain the partner relationship in supply chains and/or to 
secure their financing capabilities in the capital market. Second, the negative externality 
associated with information security risks may drive firms to invest more (Kobayashi 
2005). For example, a highly protected website may divert hackers to other sites. 
However, individual firms may ignore this negative externality and invest more than the 
socially desirable level. Third, the regulatory compliance on internal control (Bailey Jr. et 
al. 1985) may distract managers’ attention and result in overinvestment in security. For 
example, SOX 404 imposes significant personal penalty on corporate executives for 
incompliance with the internal control requirements. The compliance pressure results in 
less cost-effective spending (Leech 2004; Ranger 2005). 
Researchers and practitioners have long been studying how to motivate firms to 
invest in information security at the socially optimal level. Many researchers (Varian 
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2000; Gordon et al. 2003; Ogut et al. 2005b; Kesan et al. 2005) have proposed that firms 
can use cyberinsurance to manage their information security risks and optimize their 
security expenditure. Cyberinsurance is a range of first-party and third-party coverage 
that enables firms to transfer their security risks to the insurance market.6 With the 
cyberinsurance market, firms can balance the expenditure between security protection 
and insurance, and thus reduce the cost-ineffective investment. Therefore, cyberinsurance 
can be a potential approach to address the overinvestment issue.   
This paper finds that even if the cyberinsurance market is mature (i.e., with 
actuarially fair premium and no agency problem), it cannot eliminate overinvestment. We 
start with the case that firms overinvest due to competition. That is, when security 
investments can bring firms some competitive advantages besides loss prevention, firms 
tend to overinvest. In this case, cyberinsurance cannot alleviate the competitive effect of 
security investment and firms still have an incentive to overinvest.  
Interestingly, we show that firms may prefer a “less mature” risk management 
solution, which induces the moral hazard problem. In the context of insurance, moral 
hazard refers to the policyholders’ reluctance to invest in loss prevention and loss 
reduction (Pauly 1968). Although moral hazard is not a favorable feature in general (e.g., 
Shavell 1979), we find that it can effectively mitigate firms’ overinvestment incentive. 
This benefits firms by preventing the “prisoners’ dilemma” where all firms heavily invest 
in security but the advantage of increased investment is competed away. In this paper, we 
specifically study such a “less mature” risk management solution – the risk pooling 
arrangement (RPA).    
                                                 
6 Examples of existing policies include AIG’s NetAdvantage, Lloyd’s e-Comprehensive, Chubb’s CyberSecurity, 
Hiscox’s Hacker Insurance, etc. The coverage of cyberinsurance includes damages in loss/corruption of data, business 
interruption, liability, cyber extortion, public relations, criminal rewards, cyber-terrorism, and identity theft. 
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RPA generally refers to the mutual form of insurance organizations in which the 
policyholders are also the owners. Examples of RPA include group captive insurance 
companies, risk retention groups, self insurance groups, etc.7 The mutual form of 
insurance organizations was widely adopted in the insurance markets for medical 
malpractice and municipal liability during the late 1980s (Ligon and Thistle 2005). It has 
also been since used in other lines of insurance, such as employee pension and employee 
health insurance. From the perspective of practitioners, the primary advantages of RPA 
over commercial insurance include reduced overhead expense and flexible policy 
development (Swiss Re 2003). 
Compared to a mature commercial cyberinsurance market, RPA is “less mature” 
in two ways. First, RPA cannot completely eliminate the risks for an individual 
policyholder. Even though the risk pool can fully cover individual firms’ security losses, 
each individual firm has to bear part of the risk pool’s loss through its equity position. Put 
differently, RPA leaves positive risk retention for individual members. Second, RPA 
induces the moral hazard problem (Lee and Ligon 2001). Since members of the risk pool 
share risks with each other, an individual firm’s risks are not completely influenced by its 
own security investment. Therefore, individual firms have an incentive to reduce their 
investment. This type of moral hazard is also known as “moral hazard in team” 
(Holmstrong 1982). 
The analysis in this paper reveals that RPA can outperform a mature 
cyberinsurance market in addressing the overinvestment issue. When the competition is 
                                                 
7 Group captives are special insurance companies that are set up by a group of companies to insure their own risks. 
Many large corporations have their own single-parent captives. From 2000 to 2004, net premiums written in the captive 
insurance industry grew by 56 percent, reaching more than $50 billion. Risk retention groups (RRG) are insurance 
institutions in which entities in a common industry join together to provide members with liability insurance. In 2005, 
RRG’s gross written premium reached $2.5 billion. Self-insurance groups are insurance entities in which firms in 
similar industries or geographic locations pool resources to insure each other’s risks. In 2003, gross written premium of 
self-insurance groups reached $44 billion (Swiss De 2003; Insurance Information Institute 2006).  
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sufficiently intense, firms can be better off by setting up a risk pool to share risks with 
each other instead of using the commercial insurers. The moral hazard associated with 
RPA softens the competition among firms and mitigates their incentive to overinvest. 
Therefore, firms are willing to use RPA even though it does not fully eliminate their 
risks. However, as the size of the pool grows, the moral hazard becomes more severe and 
eventually leads to underinvestment. Consequently, RPA loses its advantage over mature 
commercial cyberinsurance. In this regard, there exists an upper bound for the pool size. 
We further show that multiple pools each with limited size will be formed when the 
number of competing firms is large.    
We then examine the case in which firms can use both RPA and commercial 
insurance. This paper shows that even when firms can access a mature commercial 
insurance market, they will still setup a risk pool and allocate certain amount of risks to 
it. Balancing insurance spending between the commercial insurance market and RPA 
always dominates pure reliance on the commercial insurance market. Moreover, as the 
number of firms approaches the infinite, we show that firms invest at the socially optimal 
level and achieve the socially optimal payoffs.  
We further extend this model to analyze two relevant scenarios. First, we consider 
a different type of security overinvestment—the overinvestment caused by the security 
risks with negative externality. The analysis shows that RPA can also mitigate the 
overinvestment incentive. Second, we relate our analysis to the research on security 
underinvestment (e.g., Anderson 2001; Kunreuther and Heal 2003). We show that 
overinvestment in certain security practices can exacerbate the problem of 
underinvestment in other security practices. Through mitigating overinvestment, RPA 
helps firms optimize the allocation of security spending and improve their overall 
payoffs.  
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Given the diverse practice of IT risk management solutions, our paper offers an 
economic rationale for the adoption of RPA. Traditionally, practitioners have recognized 
that RPA has the advantages of reduced overhead expense and flexible policy 
development. This paper indicates that RPA can reduce the undesirable security 
investment, and with limited pool size, RPA can outperform the commercial insurance 
market. Moreover, this paper provides security managers with guidance on allocating 
risks between commercial insurance and RPA. 
This paper also generates important implications for the social planner regarding 
the regulation of the insurance industry. Although the capacity limit of the commercial 
insurance market stimulates the demand for Alternative Risk Transfer (ART) solutions, 
the development of RPA is still highly subject to regulatory attitudes. Therefore, it is 
important for the social planner to recognize not only the strength of RPA in security 
management at the firm level, but also the positive impact of RPA on industry 
competition and cooperation. Such recognition can help guide the development of 
appropriate policies for RPA and improve the social welfare overall.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews related literature 
on the economics of information security and insurance. In section 3.3, we outline the 
model setup and analyze the case with only the commercial insurance market. Section 3.4 
analyzes the case with RPA and compares RPA with the commercial insurance market. 
Section 3.5 examines the case where both RPA and the commercial insurance market can 
be used. In section 3.6, we discuss the managerial and policy implications of this study 
and conclude the chapter. 
3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Prior research on the economics of information security has studied many issues 
regarding information security investment. Anderson and Moore (2006) discuss how 
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moral hazard and adverse selection problems distort firms’ incentives to invest in 
information security. Gordon and Loeb (2002) develop an economic model to study the 
optimal investment in information security. Gordon and Lucyshyn (2003), and Gal-Or 
and Ghose (2005) examine firms’ incentives to share security information and show that 
information sharing can benefit security investment. Kunreuther and Heal (2003) 
demonstrate that firms generally underinvest in security protection when their security 
risks are interdependent. Our paper considers the optimization problem of firms’ security 
investment. However, we focus on addressing firms’ distorted incentives to overinvest 
rather than underinvest.  
There is a growing body of literature examining the use of cyberinsurance to 
address information security. Gordon et al. (2003) and Kesan et al. (2005) generally 
discuss the advantages of cyberinsurance in information risk management. Ogut et al. 
(2005a) examine firms’ investments in security protection and their use of cyberinsurance 
in the context of interdependent security risks. All of these studies focus on the 
commercial cyberinsurance market. This paper differs from these studies in examining 
ART mechanisms (i.e., RPA) as a complement to the commercial cyberinsurance market.    
Prior literature on risk management justifies the existence of the mutual insurance 
organizations from a variety of perspectives. For example, the mutual form of insurance 
organization is more efficient when the distribution of risks prevents independent insurers 
from using the law of large numbers to eliminate risks (e.g., Marshall 1974; Doherty and 
Dionne 1993). The mutual form of insurance can also address the interest conflicts 
between insurers and policyholders since policyholders themselves are the owners of a 
mutual insurer (Mayers and Smith 1981; Mayers 1988; Cummins and Weiss 1999). 
Moreover, mutual insurers may coexist with independent insurers as a result of the 
adverse selection of risk-averse policyholders (e.g., Ligon and Thistle 2005). This paper 
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complements the above studies by illustrating the advantages of mutual insurance 
organizations from a new perspective. That is, the moral hazard problem induced by 
mutual insurance organizations can be strategically leveraged to mitigate the undesirable 
competition among policyholders.  
The moral hazard problem has been examined in the context of the conventional 
insurance market (e.g., Shavell 1979) and RPA (e.g., Lee and Ligon 2001). Shavell 
(1979) shows that partial insurance coverage can be used to address the moral hazard 
problem.  Lee and Ligon (2001) illustrate that that moral hazard problem exists in RPA 
because the sharing of risks among pool members decreases individual members’ 
incentive to invest in loss prevention. They show that the moral hazard problem becomes 
severe when there are a large number of members; hence, the size of the risk pool should 
be limited. All of these studies focus on the negative side of moral hazard in the 
insurance market. In contrast, this paper illustrates the benefit generated by the moral 
hazard associated with RPA.   
3.3 MODEL 
We consider n risk-averse firms. Each firm has an initial wealth A. All firms have 
an identical utility function U(.), where U(.) satisfies that U'(.)>0, U''(.)<0 (i.e., U(.) is 
concave), and U'''(.)≥0. We ignore the higher-order utility effect (i.e., U[4](.) and higher 
derivatives are equal to zero). Firms’ breach probabilities depend on firms’ security 
investment. Specifically, we assume that firm i’s breach probability is μ(xi), where xi 
denotes firm i’s security investment. μ(.) is a decreasing and convex function: 
( ) ( ). 0. . 0μ μ′ ′′< > . Moreover, ( )0 1μ ≤ . We also assume that a firm loses L in a security 
breach. 
More security investment not only results in a lower breach probability, but also 
brings a firm some competitive advantages over its competitors. For example, more 
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security investment may ease potential business partners’ concern over security and thus 
ensure business relationships; and more security investment can increase investors’ 
confidence about a firm’s cash flow and thus reduce its cost of raising capital from the 
financial market. Specifically, we assume that, given firm i’s security investment xi and 
its competitors’ security investments x-i, firm i gains ( )1ii ixC x n− −∑− − , where C represents 
the competition intensity.8 In other words, if firm i’s security investment is higher (lower) 
than the average security investment of its competitors, firm i gains (loses) a positive 
amount of capital: C>0.  We also assume C<1 to avoid the degenerate solution that firms 
never invest. Firm i’s expected utility can be represented as 9 
( ) ( )( )11 1
i ii i
i i i i i i
x xx U A L C x x x U A C x xn nμ μ
− −− −⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞∑ ∑− + − − + − + − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 
For notational simplicity, we use μi to denote μ(xi). 
Suppose firms can buy insurance from commercial insurers. In this paper, we 
consider the case that the commercial insurance market is mature. The perfect 
competition in the commercial insurance market leaves all surplus to the insured firms, 
and commercial insurers always earn zero profit. It is also assumed that firms’ security 
investments are observable. Therefore, when firm i buys coverage Ii, the insurance 
premium is10 i i iP Iμ= . Firm i’s expected utility can be represented as 
( )11 1
i ii i
i i i i i i i i i i i i
x xU A L C x I I x U A C x I xn nμ μ μ μ
− −− −⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞∑ ∑Π = − + − + − − + − + − − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 
                                                 
8 The linear functional form is used here mainly for the ease of exposition. However, the insight derived from this 
model is not dependent on the assumption of this functional form. 
9 Note that in this model, the security investment can bring ex ante competitive advantage, i.e., the competitive 
advantage is not dependent on the probabilistic event of security breach. However, the insight in this model can also be 
generalized to the situation where the security investment can bring ex post competitive advantage. For example, more 
security investment may ease the investors’ concern when security breach occurs and thus decrease the magnitude of 
loss.   
10 Note that we assume that the firm’s security investment cannot be contractible in the insurance market. That is, the 
commercial insurer cannot specify the level of security investment in the insurance contract and enforce it. The non-
contractibility can be attributed to the non-verifiability of the security investment. We assume that firms purchase 
insurance after their investments are observed by insurers. Given the intense competition in the insurance market, firms 
can always obtain a fair premium. 
35 
3.3.1 Only the Commercial Insurance Market 
Existing insurance literature (e.g., Shavell 1979) indicates that it is optimal for 
firms to buy full insurance in the mature insurance market, i.e., Ii=L. With this result, firm 
i’s optimal security investment can be determined using the first-order condition (FOC),  
( )( ). 1 0iU L Cμ′ ′− + − =  






−′ = −  
Lemma 3.1 In presence of competition, firms overinvest in security. 
Proof: In this first best case, the FOC is ( )( ). 1 0iU Lμ′ ′− − = . Firm i’s optimal security 
investment xi satisfies that 11i CL Lμ
−′ = − < − . Since 0iμ′′ > , firms overinvest in security 
when 0C > .           Q.E.D.  
Without competition, the only purpose of security investment is to reduce the 
insurance premium. In the presence of competition, firms tend to invest more in security 
to gain the competitive advantage. Each individual firm’s advantage will be competed 
away as all firms increase their security investment. The security investments are more 
than necessary from the perspective of a social planner. Dynes et al. (2005) find that 
although firms increase their security investment, few executives felt that such 
investment in their industry led to increased revenue. The insurance market is insufficient 
to resolve the overinvestment issue since insurance cannot mitigate the excess incentive 
of investment caused by the competition.  
3.3.2 The Risk Pooling Arrangement (RPA) 
In this section, we consider the case where n firms can form a risk pool and share 
the security loss with each other. An example is that firms may jointly setup a group 
captive insurance company. The group captive issues insurance to each firm. Since the 
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group captive is jointly funded by insured companies, the aggregate loss of the group 
captive is shared by the insureds through their equity position.11 In particular, if the risk 
pool covers firm i’s loss of an amount q, each of the other firms compensates firm i an 
amount of q/n once firm i suffers a loss.  The compensation is altogether (n-1)q/n . In this 
section, we consider the following two-stage game. In stage 1, n firms cooperatively 
choose the amount of loss q covered by the risk pool. It is assumed that q≤L. In stage 2, 
firms choose their security investment xi (i=1…n) non-cooperatively.     
We study a symmetric case. Let x-i denote the security investment of firms other 
than firm i and μ-i= μ(x-i) denote the corresponding breach probability. With the risk 
pooling arrangement, the expected utility of firm i with RPA is  
( )( ) ( )
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− −∑  denotes the binomial 
probability that k out of n-1 firms have a security breach.  
Lemma 3.2 In the symmetric case, q L= . That is, when firms form a risk pool, they use 
the risk pool to cover all the risks. 
Lemma 3.2 is consistent with the result in the literature (Lee and Ligon 2001), 
i.e., without a commercial insurance market, firms set up a risk pool to cover all of their 
risks. Since firms are risk-averse, they are always willing to transfer more risks to others. 
Consequently, the mutual insurer issues a full-coverage policy to each firm. As an equity 
holder of the risk pool, each firm not only retains a share of its own loss but also shoulder 
a share of any other firm’s loss equal to L/n. When k firms suffer security breaches, 
                                                 
11 Note that the insurance premium paid to the risk pool is suppressed from the model. The rationale is that the 
premium income of the risk pool will be returned to the member firms as the equity return.  
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resulting in the mutual insurer incurring an aggregate loss of kL, each firm eventually 
bears an equity loss of kL/n. Proposition 3.1 characterizes how RPA affects firms’ 
security investment.  
Proposition 3.1 In the symmetric equilibrium, firms invest less in security when using 
RPA than when using commercial insurance. Furthermore, firms’ investments decrease 
as the number of firms in the risk pool increases.  
Proposition 1 indicates that RPA induces the member firms to invest less. Firms 
invest less due to the moral hazard problem. When a firm’s security loss is determined by 
the aggregate investment, it has less incentive to invest. This is also called moral hazard 
in team (Holmstrom 1982). As the size of the risk pool increases, the moral hazard 
problem becomes more severe, and firms further decrease their security investment.12 In 
this way, RPA can mitigate firms’ overinvestment incentive. This capability of RPA may 
render it preferable to the commercial insurance market.  
3.3.3 The Comparison between RPA and Commercial Insurance 
We examine when RPA leads to a better outcome for insured firms than a 
competitive insurance market. In a symmetric equilibrium, we denote xP (xC) and μP (μC) 
as the equilibrium investment and breach probability, respectively, when firms use RPA 
(commercial insurance). We compare a firm’s expected utility using RPA (in Equation 
3.2) with a firm’s expected utility using commercial insurance (in Equation 3.3), 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1
0
1; 1 , 1
n
P P P P P P
k
k kn b k n U A L x U A L xn nμ μ μ
−
=
⎡ ⎤+Π = − − − + − − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑        (3.2) 
( )C C CU A L xμΠ = − −       (3.3) 
Since it is impossible to compare Equation (3.2) and Equation (3.3) analytically, 
we rely on the numerical analysis to illustrate the insights. The numerical analysis has 
                                                 
12 Lee and Ligon (2001) present a formal proof on this feature. They show that as long as one ignores the 
higher-than-fourth derivative of the utility function, the firms’ equilibrium security investment is always 
strictly decreasing in the number of the risk pool members. 
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been adopted in prior insurance research (e.g., Asmussen and Rubinstein 1999). We use the 
following specifications. The breach probability function is μ(x)=e-x. This functional form 
is consistent with the assumption that μ’(x)<0 and μ’’(x)>0. The firm’s utility function is 
U(x)=-x(20-x). This functional form is consistent with the assumption that U’(x)>0, 
U’’(x)<0, U’’’(x)≥0. The initial wealth A is 8 and the loss L is 6. The competition 
intensity C is 0.7. Figure 3.1 compares the firm’s expected utility using RPA with that 
using commercial insurance.  In Figure 3.1, the “*” line represents the firm’s expected 




As Figure 3.1 shows, when the number of firms is small (i.e., n≤7), RPA yields 
higher expected utility than the commercial insurance market. However, when the 
number of firms is large (i.e., n>7), RPA yields lower expected utility than the 
commercial insurance market. Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 together illustrate why RPA can 
dominate the commercial insurance market. Figure 3.2 compares the firm’s security 
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investment in these two cases. The “*” line represents firms’ security investment using 
RPA; the “+” line represents firms’ security investment using commercial insurance; and 
the “○” line represents the security investment at the socially optimal level. As Figure 3.2 
shows, the security investment in the commercial insurance case is higher than the 
socially optimal level. The security investment in the RPA case is lower than that in the 
commercial insurance case. This implies that the competition among firms in their 
security investment is softened, and thus explains why RPA generates a higher expected 




Note that when n≥4, the security investment in the RPA case is lower than the 
socially optimal level. This means that RPA leads to underinvestment. The reason is that 
when more firms are in the risk pool, each firm free-rides more on other firms, and the 
moral hazard problem becomes more severe. When firms invest less than the socially 
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optimal level, their expected utilities start to decrease. When n>7, the moral hazard 
problem is so severe that RPA is no longer better than the commercial insurance market.   
 
 
Figure 3.3 further separates two countervailing forces of RPA, i.e., the incomplete 
risk transfer and the decreased security investment. In Figure 3.3, the “×” line represents 
a firm’s expected utility if it uses commercial insurance but invests at the same level as it 
does when using RPA. The “+” line represents a firm’s expected utility if it uses 
commercial insurance. Therefore, the difference between the “×” line and the “+” line 
reflects the difference in a firm’s expected utility caused by the difference in security 
investment (not by the type of insurance, since the firm uses commercial insurance in 
both cases). Note that the decrease of security investment leads to a gain (a loss) in the 








Figure 3.3: The Comparison of the Firm’s Expected Utilities 
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firm’s expected utility in the range where n≤8 (n>8). The “*” line represents the expected 
utility of firms if they use RPA. Therefore, the decrease from the “×” line to the “*” line 
reflects the loss in a firm’s expected utility caused by incomplete risk transfer (the 
security investment levels in these two cases are equal). Note when n≤7 (n>7), the gain 
from the lower security investment exceeds (does not exceed) the loss from incomplete 
risk transfer, and thus RPA is better (worse) than the commercial insurance market. In 
this regard, the size of the risk pool should be bounded.  
The separation of two countervailing forces of RPA enables us to further 
investigate when RPA outperforms the commercial insurance market. Figure 4 illustrates 
that when competition is not intense enough (i.e., C=0.5), RPA never outperforms the 
commercial insurance market. With less intense competition, firms’ overinvestment 
incentive is not large. When firms use RPA, the loss caused by the incomplete risk 
transfer always exceeds the gain caused by the decreased security investment. As a result, 
firms’ expected utilities are always lower when using RPA.  
 









Figure 3.4: The Firm’s Expected Utility When Competition is Not Intense 






3.3.3 The Use of Multiple Risk Pools 
Proposition 3.1 shows that firms’ incentive to invest within a single risk pool 
decreases when the pool size increases. Consequently, using a large single risk pool may 
make firms worse off than using commercial insurance. When the number of firms is too 
large and the moral hazard problem is severe, firms need to control the size of the risk 
pool. Instead of setting up a single large pool, they can form multiple pools. We consider 
the following process of forming multiple risk pools. In the first stage, firms 
cooperatively decide how to set up pools (i.e., negotiate the pool size and the number of 
pools). In the second stage, firms non-cooperatively determine their security investments. 
Proposition 3.2 indicates that firms may form multiple pools when n is large enough. Let 
( )* arg maxm Pm m= Π , where ( ).PΠ  is defined in (3.2).  
Proposition 3.2 Suppose that the total number of firms, n, is sufficiently large and can be 
divided by m*. If ( )*P CmΠ Π> , then firms set up multiple pools with a size of m*.  
Proposition 3.2 indicates the possibility of forming multiple pools. Later, we 
compare this case with the case in which firms can use RPA and also access the 
commercial insurance market. We show that when firms can use both RPA and 
commercial insurance, the industry of risk pooling tends to consolidate and firms tend to 
form only a single pool. 
3.4 A HYBRID MODEL OF INSURANCE 
The previous section shows that the moral hazard problem associated with RPA 
can resolve the overinvestment issue, but may also result in underinvestment. In this 
section, we consider the case where firms can use both RPA and commercial insurance to 
cover their risks. The sequence of the game is as follows. In stage 1, n firms 
cooperatively choose the amount of loss q covered by the risk pool. In stage 2, given q, 
firms noncooperatively choose their security investment xi (i=1..n) and purchase 
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insurance with coverage Ii (i=1..n) in the commercial insurance market. Again, it is 
assumed that the commercial insurance market is mature. When firms can use both the 
risk pool and commercial insurance, firm i’s expected utility is  
( )( ) ( )
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Lemma 3.3 When firms use both RPA and commercial insurance, Ii=L-q if q<L. That is, 
if the risk pool does not provide full coverage, firms use commercial insurance to cover 
all the residual risks. 
Lemma 3.3 characterizes the complementary relationship between RPA and 
commercial insurance. If firms do not want to retain all the risks within the risk pool, they 
will use commercial insurance to cover the residual risks. Thus, firm i’s expected utility 
is 
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Note that the mature commercial insurance market can completely absorb firms’ 
risks. In contrast, firms retain part of the risks within the risk pool. Therefore, if firms 
want to be exposed to a lower level of risk within the risk pool, they can decrease their 
coverage in the risk pool and transfer residual risks to the commercial insurance market. 
The next question is: do firms always have an incentive to adopt RPA as a complement to 
the commercial insurance market?  
Proposition 3.3 When the competition effect of security investment exists (i.e., C>0), 
firms always have an incentive to set up a risk pool and allocate a positive amount of 
risks to the pool, i.e., q>0 
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Proposition 3.3 generates an important implication. That is, as long as competition 
drives firms to overinvest in security, firms always have an incentive to set up a risk pool 
as a complement to commercial insurance. To understand this incentive, we derive the 
marginal effect of q on firm i’s expected utility when q=0, 
    
( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )0 11|i iq i i i i i i i i xnU A x L x U A x L x U A x L x Cq n n qμ μ μ μ μ μ −= −∂Π ∂−′ ′ ′= − − − − − + − − −∂ ∂
               (3.4) 
The first term of (3.4) represents the marginal benefit that firms obtain from the 
reduced insurance premium. In other words, when the coverage of the risk pool q 
increases, the insurance coverage I decreases and firms pay a lower premium μI to 
commercial insurers. The second term of (3.4) represents the marginal loss that firms 
incur from the increased risk exposure. In particular, 1 in μ  represents the marginal loss 
from an increase in firm i’s own security breach probability, and 1n in μ− −  represents the 
marginal loss from an increase in firm i’s expected compensation to other firms. The 
third term of (3.4) represents the marginal impact of increased risk pool coverage on 




=∂ < . That is, the rival firms invest less in 
security when q increases. It is worth remarking that the third term of (3.4) is positive, 
which means that RPA mitigates the adverse consequence of competition. As the first 
two terms cancel out in a symmetric equilibrium, the overall marginal impact of q on the 
firm’s expected utility is positive (i.e., 0| 0i qq
∂Π
=∂ > ), and thus firms always have an 
incentive to set up a risk pool.  
Proposition 3.4. When firms can use both RPA and commercial insurance, they only 
form a single risk pool. 
The comparison between Proposition 3.2 and Proposition 3.4 generates another 
important implication. The combined use of commercial insurance and RPA leads to the 
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consolidation of risk pools. When firms only use RPA, the moral hazard problem restricts 
the size of the risk pool. Therefore, the consolidation of risk pools is difficult. When a 
mature commercial insurance market is available, firms can control the degree of moral 
hazard by allocating more risks to the commercial insurance market (i.e., decreasing the 
coverage of the risk pool). As a consequence, there will be no excessive moral hazard in a 
single risk pool and one risk pool is enough.    
Next, we consider how firms allocate their risks between RPA and the 
commercial insurance market. We first illustrate a set of simulation results to show the 
amount of risk allocated to the risk pool (i.e., q) when n increases. Second, we 
analytically show an interesting result that firms’ security investments and expected 
utilities approach the socially optimal levels when n approaches the infinite.   
We still use the breach probability function μ(x)=e-x and the utility function 
U(x)=-x(20-x). Figure 3.5 illustrates the optimal amount of loss that firms would like to 
share in the risk pool. Generally speaking, the amount of loss shared in the risk pool 
decreases as the size of the risk pool increases (except for the range from n=2 to n=3). 
The reason is that when there are more members in a risk pool, the moral 
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hazard problem is more severe and firms have less incentive to invest in security. As a 
consequence, when the risk pool becomes large, firms can choose to buy more insurance 
from the commercial insurance market and retain fewer risks in the risk pool. Note that 
firms share fewer risks when n=2 than when n=3. The lower level of coverage is due to 
the nature of the incomplete risk transfer associated with RPA.  When n=2, the number of 
firms sharing risks is not large enough. If a small risk pool (with only two members) 
covers a large amount of risk, the amount of risk each member has to retain is large. 
Therefore, firms tend to decrease their coverage in the risk pool in order to reduce the 
risk retention.  
Figure 3.6 shows firms’ security investment in the case with both RPA and 
commercial insurance. As the number of firms increases, the security investment (the line 
with mark “□”) keeps decreasing but never drops below the socially optimal level. In 
particular, the security investment approaches the socially optimal level from above. 
Unlike the case with only RPA, the hybrid model does not lead to security 
Figure 3.5: The Amount of Loss Covered by the Risk Pool 
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underinvestment. The results imply that firms can alleviate the moral hazard problem 
associated with RPA by reducing their coverage in the risk pool and buying insurance 
from commercial insurers.  
 
   
Figure 3.7 compares the firm’s expected utility in the hybrid model (the dot line 
with mark “□”) with those in other cases. Note that in the hybrid model, the firm’s 
expected utility increases and approaches the socially optimal level as n becomes large. 
In the case with only RPA, however, the firm’s expected utility eventually decreases. A 
hybrid model can effectively leverage the moral hazard problem associated with RPA to 
mitigate firms’ overinvestment incentive, without generating underinvestment.      
Proposition 3.5 When n ∞, firms’ security investments and expected utilities approach 
the socially optimal levels.  
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To understand Proposition 3.5, note that when n approaches the infinite, in a 
symmetric equilibrium, the law of large numbers implies that the expected number of 
firms with a security breach approaches nμ. Therefore, the expected out-of-pocket 
compensation that a firm affords in the risk pool is (nμ×q)/n = μq, and a firm’s expected 
utility approaches  
( )( )i i iU A q L q xμ μ− − − −          (3.5) 
Expression (3.5) implies that in the extreme case where n approaches the infinite, 
firms essentially obtain a “full insurance equivalence” by paying a “total insurance 
premium” of μq+ μi(L-q). Note that the premium μi(L-q) is paid to commercial insurers. 
μq can be understood as a “premium equivalence” paid within the risk pool. “Premium 
equivalence” is an aggregate compensation that firm i pays other firms suffering security 
losses, in exchange for a compensation from other firms when firm i itself suffers a 
security loss. Firms’ security investment can only reduce the premium μi(L-q) paid to the 
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commercial insurer, but has no impact on the “premium equivalence” μq paid within the 
risk pool. The reason is that the “premium equivalence” of firm i is affected by other 
firms’ security investments. Therefore, by adjusting q and allocating more risks to the 
risk pool, firms can effectively reduce the overinvestment incentive driven by 
competition. Moreover, a sufficiently large risk pool provides a “full insurance 
equivalence” and complete risk transfer. Firms can resolve the security overinvestment 
problem at no cost and achieve the socially optimal outcome.      
3.5 EXTENSIONS 
In this section, we extend our model to consider two relevant issues. First, we 
consider the overinvestment caused by the negative externality of security. Second, we 
relate our analysis of security overinvestment to the case of security underinvestment.  
3.5.1 Negative Externality of Security Investment 
The model so far concerns the security overinvestment driven by competition. 
However, the current model setup can be extended to study other types of security 
overinvestment, for example, the overinvestment caused by the negative externality of 
security risks. When there is a common pool of malicious hackers, for instance, it is very 
likely that the security investment by one firm will drive malicious hackers to target other 
firms and thus generate negative externality on other firms. In other words, the security 
investment increases the probability of security breaches on other firms while reducing 
the investing firm’s own security risks.  







+ −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
∑ . Note that firm i’s 
breach probability is increasing in other firms’ investment x-i. This captures the adverse 
impact of other firms’ investments on firm i’s breach probability. Again, assume that μ’< 
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0, μ’’>0, i.e., μ is convex. Thus, firm i’s expected utility in the case with only commercial 
insurance can be represented as  





x x nμ μ
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∑ . Appendix proves that firms will overinvest in this case. 
This is because firms tend to ignore the negative externality of their investments on other 
firms’ security. Again, the commercial insurance market is insufficient to mitigate the 
overinvestment, since commercial insurance does not alter the negative externality of an 
individual firm’s investment. 
 
Similarly, if firms adopt RPA, they will decrease their security investment due to the 
moral hazard problem. We illustrate this intuition using a numerical analysis. Again, 
assume that the breach probability function is μ(x)=e-x, and the utility function is U(x)=-







Figure 3.8: The Firm’s Expected Utilities with Negative Externality 
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x(20-x). Figure 3.8 illustrates how the hybrid model with both RPA and commercial 
insurance benefits firms. In Figure 3.8, the firm’s expected utility in the case with both 
RPA and commercial insurance is always higher than that in the case with only 
commercial insurance. Moreover, as n increases, the firm’s expected utility in the case 
with the hybrid model approaches that in the socially optimal case.   
3.5.2 Security Underinvestment 
Although the main issue examined in this paper is security overinvestment, our 
work can relate to the general consideration of the security underinvestment issue (i.e., 
firms lack incentive to invest sufficiently in security protection). It is worth remarking 
that although firms may underinvest at the aggregate level, they may still overinvest in 
certain security areas. When firms face security budget constraints, the overinvestment in 
certain security practices may exacerbate the underinvestment in other security practices. 
Empirical studies (e.g., Rowe and Gallaher 2006) indicate that in reality, many 
organizations actually face a fairly fixed budget in security and they can only maximize 
the overall level of security subject to a predetermined level of resources.  
We extend our model to consider a scenario with multiple types of security risks. 
Suppose that firms can invest in two different types of security practices, x and y. The 
investment x has negative spillovers and the investment y has positive spillovers. ( )ixμ  
and ( )1i iyi nyη − −∑ −+  capture the impact of security investments x and y on the firm’s breach 
probability, respectively.  We denote ( )i ixμ μ=  and ( )1i iyi i nyη η − −∑ −= + . It is assumed that 
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                     s.t. i ix y B+ ≤                              (3.8) 
The first (fourth) term in (3.7) represents the case when both (neither) a security 
breach associated with x and (or) a security breach associated with y occur (s).  The 
second (third) term in (3.7) represents the case where only the security breach associated 
with x (y) occurs. Similar to the base model, the term ( )1i ixi nC x − −∑ −−  reflects the 
competitive effect of security investment x. The functional form ( )1i iyi nyμ − −∑ −+  reflects the 
positive externality of investment y. The more other firms invest in y, the less likely that 
firm i has a security breach. For example, if other firms invest more to prevent their 
computers from being hacked and taken as zombies, the probability that firm i suffers 
DDoS attack will be lower. Unlike the investment x, the investment y does not lead to any 
competitive advantage. For example, firms’ investment in preventing their internal users 
from sending out viruses and email spam may not directly benefit the firms themselves.  
Expression (3.8) represents the firm’s budget constraint. In this analysis we focus 
on the relevant case where the budget constraint (3.8) is always binding. Therefore, firm i 
needs to balance its spending on different types of security investments.  
Proposition 3.6 In the symmetric equilibrium, when the budget constraint is binding, (a) 
firms overinvest in x and underinvest in y; (b) a firm’s investment in y is decreasing in C.  
Firms invest less in y when C>0 than in the case when C=0.  
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∂ ∂= , i.e.,  
( )( ) ( )( ). 1 . 1i iU L C U Lμ η′ ′ ′ ′− + − = − −     (3.9) 
In the first-best case, however, firm i’s investments xi and yi should satisfy  
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1. 1 . 1 11i i nU L U L nμ η −′ ′ ′ ′− − = − + −−          (3.10) 
The comparison between (3.9) and (3.10) indicates that firm i underinvests in y 
due to the interdependent nature of security risks (Kunreuther and Heal 2003; Ogut et al. 
2005a; Gordon and Lucyshyn 2003; Varian 2004; Powell 2005). In other words, firm i 
ignores the impact of its investment yi on reducing other firms’ breach probabilities. 
Furthermore, compared to the C=0 case (i.e., the investment x has no competitive effect), 
the C>0 case (i.e., investment x has a positive competitive impact) leads to a smaller 
investment in y. The competition drives firms to allocate more resources to investment x, 
which exacerbates the problem of underinvestment in y.  
Again, we use a numerical analysis to illustrate this result. Assuming 
μ(x)=η(x)=e-x, U(x)=-x(20-x), A=8, L=4, C=0.7, and the security investment budget is 





3.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Compared with security underinvestment, security overinvestment is an under-
researched issue. However, previous research emphasizes (Powell 2005) that addressing 
security overinvestment can be as important as addressing security underinvestment. 
Firms need to rationalize as well as optimize their security spending. In this paper we 
consider several potential reasons that can drive firms to overinvest in security, and we 
study a risk management approach, i.e., the risk pooling arrangement, as a solution to the 
overinvestment problem. The key insight is that RPA allows firms to leverage the moral 
hazard in team, a traditionally undesirable phenomenon, to mitigate the overinvestment 
incentive. This study of using RPA to resolve security overinvestment not only generates 
implications for security management, but also provides a new understanding of the role 
of mutual insurance. In this section, we discuss the managerial and policy implications 
generated by this analysis and provide directions for future research. 
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3.6.1 Managerial Implications 
Security overinvestment can be caused by destructive competition, negative 
network externality, or managerial discretionary investment. Identifying and resolving 
security overinvestment can help firms rationalize their security spending and better 
manage competitive relationships. The appropriate use of a risk management solution, 
such as RPA, to resolve security overinvestment requires firms to effectively assess the 
characteristics of specific risks they are facing. For example, firms need to assess whether 
there are certain types of security risks that are likely to affect their competitive 
advantage and induce a rat race among competitors. Are certain types of security risks 
likely to generate negative externality to other competitors, customers, and suppliers? Are 
certain types of security risks (e.g., compliance-related security risks) likely to be of 
special concern for the managers and result in discretionary investment? To manage 
different types of security risks, the RPA may need different types of professional 
expertise in risk assessment, insurance policy development, incident handling, etc. The 
effective use of RPA can generate benefits for firms from both the outside and the inside. 
From the outside, RPA may help alleviate destructive competition among firms. The 
mitigation of overinvestment caused by negative network externality can also lead to a 
higher social surplus. Inside the firm, the accessibility of RPA can help managers 
prioritize security expenditures and better manage security risks.  
This study also illustrates the benefit of using both RPA and commercial 
insurance. Firms need to recognize that these two risk management approaches are 
complements to, rather than substitutes for, each other.  A traditional advantage of using 
RPA is the flexibility of mutual insurers to develop and issue more specialized insurance 
policies to its members. Firms can use RPA to cover those risks that are not covered by 
the commercial insurance market or are not suitable to be covered by the commercial 
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insurance market. For example, for those security problems with interdependent risks 
(Kunreuther and Heal 2003), RPA is not an optimal choice, since it may exaggerate the 
security underinvestment problem. Instead, firms can acquire policies from the 
commercial insurance market to cover them.  Therefore, firms need to carefully study the 
characteristics of security risks and choose appropriate lines of insurance from different 
sources.  
3.6.2 Policy Implications  
This paper also generates important policy implications for the social planner 
regarding regulation of insurance industry. In general, the insurance industry is highly 
regulated, and the development of RPA is subject to these regulatory attitudes.  For 
example, in many jurisdictions, certain lines of insurance can only be underwritten by an 
admitted commercial insurer but not by a mutual insurer. Other factors affecting the 
adoption of RPA include restrictions on the risk pool’s underwriting terms, the 
deductibility of insurance premiums for corporate taxation purposes, and the risk pool’s 
access to the reinsurance market. However, considering the potential of RPA to address 
the issue of security overinvestment and mitigate destructive competition, it is 
worthwhile for the social planner to reexamine and improve existing regulatory policies 
on mutual insurance to encourage the development of risk pooling arrangements.  
3.6.3 Future Directions 
This study can be extended in many directions. First, future research can consider 
the situation with heterogeneous firms. For example, the impacts of security investment 
on competitive advantages can be different for firms of different sizes. Large firms are 
more likely to form a RPA to mitigate intense competition. Moreover, the heterogeneity 
among firms may lead to the formation of different mutual organizations. Thus, an 
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analysis of heterogeneous firms can generate rich implications on the coexistence of 
miscellaneous mutual insurance organizations.  
The second potential direction is to incorporate more organizational 
characteristics of RPA and further examine the impact of RPA on firms’ security 
investments. Prior literature suggests that mutual insurance organizations are generally 
inferior in controlling the managerial discretion (e.g., Mayers and Smith 11981; 
Cummins and Weiss 1999). Therefore, mutual organizations are not suitable to provide 
certain lines of insurance that require a large amount of managerial discretion in pricing 
and underwriting. However, how the managerial discretion of the insurer affects the 
policyholder’s security investment is not clear. Future research on how the mutual form 
of insurance impacts security investments may benefit by incorporating the consideration 
of managerial discretion.    
The third potential direction for future research is to examine the competition 
between mutual insurance companies and other forms of insurance organizations: for 
example, how commercial insurers may develop more appealing policies in response to 
the competitive threats from the mutual insurers. Such research will improve the 
understanding of the interaction between different risk management solutions.  
From the practitioner’s point of view, it is worthwhile to consider which lines of 
insurance are appropriate for RPA and mutual organizations, and which lines of 
insurance are appropriate for the commercial insurance market. Studies in this direction 
can also benefit the social planner in developing policies to boost the growth of RPA and 
other ART solutions.    
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Chapter 4: How Fast to Patch? An Economic Analysis on the 
Information Role of Vendors’ Patching Strategies 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The classic "lemon market" issue is common in the software market (Akerlof 
1970). The complexity of software makes it difficult for consumers to learn of the 
software quality in a short period of time. Consequently, consumers’ purchasing 
decisions are largely affected by the reputation of software products. Traditionally, 
reputation is developed and diffused through word-of-mouth, which has limited reach 
(Banerjee and Fudenberg 2004; Ellison and Fudenberg 1995). However, recent growth of 
the Internet accelerates information dissemination and expedites reputation building. 
Experts and consumers share their comments and opinions through various websites (e.g., 
CNET) and discussion forums (e.g., slashdot) on a global scale. Thus, maintaining and 
enhancing reputation naturally becomes one of the most important factors that vendors 
consider when making strategic decisions, including those regarding patch development 
and release.  
Patching after software release is an integrated phase to the software development 
cycle. Although software vendors make significant investments, including effort and 
capital to improve the software development process, it is impossible to develop software 
without any vulnerability. Patching vulnerabilities improves the security level of a 
software product and hence influences its reputation. Given the increasing role that 
patching plays in the software market, strategic aspects of patching strategies need to be 
studied.  
The reputation of a software product fluctuates following vulnerability and patch 
announcements. Publishing vulnerabilities increases security risks and hence degrades the 
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quality of the affected software. Vendors suffer a loss in reputation in the software 
market. By patching vulnerabilities, they improve the quality of the software and ease 
consumers’ concerns about security risks, salvaging their damaged reputation. The earlier 
patches are released, the sooner the software’s reputation is rebuilt. We refer to such a 
reputation effect of patching strategies as the salvage effect of patching strategies.  
Patching, in addition to salvaging the reputation, has the potential to enhance the 
vendor-customer relationship. van Doorn and Verhoef (2007) find that critical incidents 
cause an update of customers’ satisfaction regarding the providers. They suggest that 
firms should understand the impact of critical incidents on their customer relationship and 
distinguish the appropriate incidents which can be used as instruments to intensify their 
customer relationship. The incidents of vulnerability disclosure create opportunities for 
vendors to enhance customer satisfaction and boost their reputation. In particular, 
vendors may use patching strategies, a remedy to critical incidents, to eliminate the 
quality uncertainty and improve the reputation of their software.  
Patching strategies can be used to eliminate information asymmetry because of 
the correlation between the software quality and the patching cost. It is very likely that 
the patching cost is negatively correlated to the software quality. That is, the better the 
quality of a software product, the less costly it is for the vendor to repair vulnerabilities 
quickly. A well-designed software product normally has better structure and is relatively 
easier to maintain (e.g., Unix). It is also possible that the patching cost is positively 
correlated to the software quality. That is, the better the quality of a software product, the 
more costly it is for the vendor to repair it quickly. For a software product with intricate 
functionality that customers appreciate, it may take more time and effort to repair its 
vulnerabilities (e.g., Microsoft Windows or Microsoft Office). The existence of a 
correlation enables vendors to leverage patching strategies to reveal hidden information, 
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the inherent quality of their software, to consumers and reestablish the reputation of their 
software. We refer to such a reputation effect of patching strategies as the signaling effect 
of patching strategies.  
In this paper, we investigate the salvage effect and the signaling effect of patching 
strategies using a game-theoretic model. We consider a group of software vendors, each 
of which is licensing a software product to consumers in a finite time horizon. The 
software products can be of high-quality or low-quality. After the software is released, 
vulnerabilities associated with the software may be identified and vendors can repair 
vulnerabilities by developing patches. It is time-consuming and costly to develop a patch. 
And the more a vendor invests, the more quickly a patch can be released. We assume that 
the vulnerabilities of software with varying quality can be repaired at different costs. The 
quality and the patching cost are only known by vendors.  
The reputation of a software product is the consumers’ expectation of its quality 
and security level. Specifically, the reputation of a software product is higher if it is more 
likely that the software is of high-quality. Since vulnerabilities reduce the security level 
of a software product, the reputation of the software decreases if a vulnerability is 
disclosed. Reputation is also updated following the announcement of a patch. A patch can 
help vendors rebuild or even further improve the reputation of the software. However, it 
is also likely that patch release causes a reputation slump, as it signals low quality.  
We use a signaling game to analyze the role of patching strategies (Lin et al 
2005). Here, vendors are senders and consumers are receivers. In traditional signaling 
games, signals are always sent at the beginning of the game, and the specifications of 
actions by senders transfer valuable information. In our study, signals are sent out in the 
intermediate stage of the game. The timing of patch release becomes the signal since it is 
not equally costly and time-consuming for vendors to develop patches. Considering the 
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dynamics of the signaling process, we define a new belief profile for receivers. That is, 
receivers’ beliefs at any time are determined by whether they have received any signals 
so far; hence the update of receivers’ beliefs takes place over time. Using this belief 
profile, we are able to identify two types of separating outcomes in which vendors of 
software with different quality release patches for vulnerabilities at different times.  
We first consider the case in which a vendor’s repairing cost is negatively 
correlated to the quality of the software, that is, it is less costly to repair high-quality 
software than low-quality software. We identify a normal separating equilibrium in 
which vendors of high-quality software patch vulnerabilities faster than vendors of low-
quality software. The salvage effect motivates all vendors to patch vulnerabilities as early 
as possible. Since it is less costly for vendors of high-quality software to release patches 
quickly, they can choose a release time earlier enough to prevent low-quality vendors 
from mimicking. Vendors of low-quality software cannot catch up with vendors of high-
quality software and thus choose to release their patches at a later time. Therefore, 
vendors of high-quality software can leverage the patching release time to signal the 
quality of their software and obtain a premium in the software market. The signal effect 
strengthens the incentives for vendors with high-quality software to release patches 
quickly.  
When it is more costly to patch high-quality software than low-quality software, 
we identify an atypical separating equilibrium in which vendors of low-quality software 
repair vulnerabilities faster than vendors of high-quality software. Vendors of low-quality 
software do not postpone the release time to mimic vendors of high-quality software 
because the loss in reputation for vendors of low-quality software from unpatched 
vulnerabilities exceeds the benefit from misrepresenting their products. The salvage 
effect dominates the signaling effect for vendors of low-quality software. Consequently, 
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they repair vulnerabilities earlier to salvage their declined reputation. For vendors of 
high-quality software, the release time must be late enough to intimidate those of low-
quality software from mimicking. Although the salvage effect drives vendors of high-
quality software to patch vulnerabilities quickly, the signaling effect weakens such 
incentives.  
As software security becomes a major concern for organizations and individuals, 
issues of software vulnerability disclosure and patch release have attracted tremendous 
attention in academia and industry (Arora and Telang 2005; Arora et al. 2005; Arora et 
al. 2006b, 2006c; August and Tunca 2006a, 2006b; Cavusoglu et al. 2004, 2007; Arora et 
al. 2007; Choi et al. 2007). To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first one to 
consider the information role of patch strategies in a dynamic setting. We show that 
patching strategies can be leveraged to eliminate quality uncertainty. This study deepens 
the understanding of vendors’ strategic patching decisions.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 4.2, we review the 
literature on software vulnerability disclosure and patch release, and information 
asymmetry. In section 4.3, we outline the model setup. Section 4.4 analyzes the model 
and presents important results. Finally we conclude the paper.   
4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Currently software vulnerabilities are disclosed though many sources, such as 
CERT/CC (Computer Security Incident Response Team/Coordination Center), iDefence, 
the Bugtraq mailing list, and Secunia. Researchers believe that disclosure causes a loss to 
vendors and hence expedites the process of patching development and release, and there 
is a stream of literature exploring various issues of software vulnerability disclosure and 
patch release. Cavusoglu et al. (2004) and Telang and Wattal (2005) have confirmed that 
vendors incur a significant loss from vulnerability disclosure. Using an event study, they 
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both find that vulnerability announcements or disclosures have a negative impact on the 
market value of the affected vendors. Arora et al. (2005) empirically show that the instant 
disclosure policy leads to earlier patch delivery. Arora et al. (2006b) empirically examine 
the competition effect of vulnerability disclosure and patch release, and find that an 
increase in the number of competitors lowers expected patching time. Malicious hackers’ 
behavior has been studied as well. Arora et al. (2006c) indicate that hackers are able to 
infer software flaws from released patches and devise targeted attacks. Patching an 
already known vulnerability decreases the number of attacks, and patching an unknown 
vulnerability, surprisingly, increases the number of attacks.  
There is a contentious debate on whether and how to disclose software 
vulnerabilities. Proponents of vulnerability disclosure claim that vulnerability disclosure 
enables users to take precautions, and pushes software vendors to release patches quickly. 
Opponents argue that vulnerability disclosure, especially without a patch, will expose 
users to security risks as crackers (black-hat hackers) can easily identify and exploit the 
vulnerabilities. Hence, researchers have been searching for the optimal disclosure policy. 
Arora et al. (2007) show that vendors always choose to patch less expeditiously than the 
socially optimal level, and the social planner can optimally shrink the protected period to 
push vendors to deliver patches in a timely manner. Cavusoglu et al. (2007) consider the 
characteristics of the vulnerability, cost structure of users, and vendor’s incentives to 
develop a patch, and identify conditions under which full vendor disclosure, immediate 
public disclosure, or hybrid disclosure are socially optimal.  
In addition to examining disclosure policies from the perspective of a social 
planner, researchers have also studied the incentives of independent third parties, users, 
and software vendors to publish vulnerabilities. Camp and Wolfram (2000) propose a 
market for vulnerabilities to enhance information security. Kannan and Telang (2005) 
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compare a CERT-type disclosure mechanism with a market-based disclosure mechanism 
that offers monetary rewards for finding vulnerabilities (e.g., iDefense). They 
demonstrate that the latter, if not regulated, always underperforms the former. Nizovtsev 
and Thursby (2006) investigate the rationality of an individual user’s decision to disclose 
security information and indicate that full public disclosure of vulnerabilities can be 
socially optimal. Choi et al (2007) analyze vendors’ strategic decisions on vulnerability 
disclosure and quality provision. Although researchers have called for more responsible 
disclosure procedures and proposed various disclosure policies, it is difficult to control or 
regulate the disclosure process given the unbounded freedom of the Internet. In this 
paper, we focus on the case where vulnerabilities are published instantly.  
The connection between vendors’ marketing strategies and patching strategies has 
been examined analytically. Arora et al. (2006a) show that a vendor has incentives to 
release a buggier product first and patch it later. August and Tunca (2006a) consider 
users’ patching costs and negative network security externalities, and derive the optimal 
patching policies from the perspectives of a social planner and a software vendor. August 
and Tunca (2006b) explore the impact of patch policies on software piracy. They identify 
conditions under which software vendors should restrict unlicensed users from applying 
security patches. Our paper focuses on the information role of patching strategies. In 
particular, we illustrate how vendors can leverage patching strategies to eliminate 
information asymmetry.  
Reputation has been recognized as a valuable asset which generates higher future 
sales and profitability (Wilson 1985). It becomes an important factor in vendors’ decision 
making processes. Weigelt and Camerer (1988) review game-theoretic models on 
reputation-building and apply them in various corporate environments. Werbel and 
Wortman (2000)’s study suggests that companies may strategically use corporate 
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philanthropy to remedy negative social reputation. However, Rhee and Haunschild 
(2006) found that reputation could be a disadvantage. They empirically test how firms’ 
reputation affects market reactions to product defects and find that highly reputed firms 
are punished more heavily for their product recalls. Recently online reputation systems 
have been widely used in the electronic trading environment, such as online auction sites 
(e.g., eBay and eLance), online shopping search engines (e.g., BizRate and Pricegrabber), 
and online forum (e.g., Slashdot). The Internet accelerates information dissemination and 
magnifies the reputation effect to a global scale. This paper studies vendors’ patching 
strategies and investigates two reputation effects, the salvage effect and the signaling 
effect, in a dynamic setting.  
Our work also relates to the literature on information asymmetry. Akerlof (1970) 
indicates that when information is asymmetric between buyers and sellers in the 
marketplace, low-quality products may drive high-quality products out of the market. 
Signaling games have been widely adopted to study adverse selection issues (Spence 
1973; Cho and Kreps 1987; Lin et al 2005; Mailath 1987; Zhao et al. 2006). All of the 
models above share the common characteristics that players with private information 
send out informative signals at the beginning of the game. In our paper, signals are sent at 
the intermediate stage of the game. Specifically the timing of actions is the signal. 
4.3 MODEL 
We consider a group of software vendors who are licensing software products to 
consumers in a finite horizon T . Vendors can be one of two types, {high,low}. Vendors 
differ in the quality of software products that they are licensing. Specifically, the quality 
of the software offered by a high-type vendor is higher than that by a low-type vendor. 
We use ir  to denote the software quality and h lr r> . A vendor’s type (the quality of its 
software product) is only known by the vendor itself, but the distribution of types is 
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common knowledge. We assume ( )Pr hr r δ= =  and ( )Pr 1lr r δ= = − . The expected 
quality of the software is ( )1h lr r rδ δ= + − .  
At the beginning of the game, a vulnerability that is associated with all of the 
software is discovered and published. Malicious hackers may devise attacks targeting the 
vulnerability, and the security risk for all of the software will increase. Consequently, the 
quality of the software will drop. îr  is used to denote the quality of a software product 
with an unpatched vulnerability and ˆi irr < . The expected quality of the software with an 
unpatched vulnerability is ( )ˆ 1ˆ ˆh lr r rδ δ= + − . It is assumed that ˆ ˆh lh lr r r r> > >  given 
that the vulnerability is critical.  
Vendors can repair the vulnerability at a cost. They make a one-time decision on 
when to release patches. s  is used to denote the release time. We assume that the patch 
release time is deterministic. A vendor with type i  has to invest ( )iC s  in order to release 
the patch at time [ ]0s T∈ , . In order to release a patch early, vendors must heavily invest 
in the patch development. We assume ( )iC s  is decreasing and convex: 
( ) 0 ( ) 0i iC s C s
′ ′′< , > . s  also characterizes the patching speed. The smaller s  is, the faster 
the vendor repairs the vulnerability. Without loss of generality, we assume ( ) iki sC s = . It 
is assumed that the patch can completely repair the vulnerability. Thus, the quality of a 
software product after patching is ir .  
We assume that there is a constant flow of new customers with the normalized 
size 1 at any time. Since consumers do not know the quality of the software, their 
willingness to pay (WTP) is determined by the reputation of the software. For simplicity, 
we assume that the WTP is equal to the reputation. We define the reputation of a software 
product as its expected quality. If consumers do not know the quality of software 
products, the reputation of a software product without any vulnerability is r  and of a 
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software product with an unpatched vulnerability is r̂ . When consumers know the quality 
of software products, the reputation of a software product is its quality. 
4.4 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
4.4.1 Base Analysis 
We first analyze how the reputation affects the patch release time. We denote the 
reputation of a software product after a vulnerability is disclosed but before a patch is 
released as 1r  and the reputation after a patch is released as 2r . The profit of a vendor 
with type i , { }i h l∈ , , can be represented as:  
 ( ) ( )1 2 2 2 10 ( )
s T
i is
r dt r dt C s r T r r s C s+ − = − − −∫ ∫  
 
FOC is  
 ( )2 1 ir r C s′− = −  
 








     (4.1) 
( )2 2 12bi ir k r rπ = − −     (4.2) 
The reputation of the affected software declines after a vulnerability is disclosed. 
Consumers are concerned about security risks and less willing to pay for the vulnerable 
software. Venders have an incentive to repair the vulnerability to rebuild their reputation 
and increase their profitability. Vendors’ patching decisions are determined by the 
patching cost and the difference between 2r  and 1r . In particular, the more costly for a 
vendor to patch a vulnerability, the later the vendor releases a patch. The more the 
reputation can be increased by patching, the earlier the vendor releases a patch. 
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From equation, (4.1) and (4.2), we can obtain the release time and the profit for a 
vendor under two information structures, complete information and partially incomplete 
information. 
Complete Information: If consumers always know the quality of the software, 
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Partially Incomplete Information: If consumers know the quality of the 
software only after the vendor releases a patch, 1 ˆr r=  and 2 ir r= , { }i h l∈ , . The release 
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4.4.2 Asymmetric Information 
When consumers do not know the quality of a software product, their WTP is 
determined by the reputation of the software. Since high-type vendors and low-type 
vendors initially share the same reputation, they have the same instantaneous revenue at 
the early stage of the game. It is not difficult to see that high-type vendors lose and low-
type vendors benefit from information asymmetry. Vendors’ heterogeneous costs to 
repair vulnerabilities enable them to disclose valuable information through their patching 
strategies. In this paper, we are interested in equilibria in which high-type vendors and 
low-type vendors choose different release times. Put differently, vendors of different 
types repair vulnerabilities at different speeds.  
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Different from traditional signaling games where informative actions are taken 
and signals are sent at the beginning of the game, the signal in this paper is generated in 
the intermediate stage. In fact, the timing of actions is actually the signal. The reputation 
of a software product at any time t  is determined by the signal-whether a patch has been 
released by t . We use tA  to represent the signal. 1tA =  represents the event that a patch 
has been released by the time t  and 0tA =  represents the event that no patch has been 
released by the time t . ( )Prt th A|  denotes consumers’ belief that a vendor is high-type at 
time t  given the signal tA . The corresponding reputation of the software product is 
( ) ( )Pr 1 Prˆ ˆh lt t t th A h Ar r⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠| + − |  if 0tA =  or ( ) ( )Pr 1 Prt t h t t lh A r h A r⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠| + − |  if 1tA = . s
−  
represents the time which is infinitely close to s . In this study, we define two types of 
separating equilibria. 
Definition 1: We define a pure-strategy normal separating equilibrium as  
( ) [ ) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] ( ){ }0, 0, ,, , ,Pr | 0 ,Pr | 1 1,Pr | 0 0hh h hh l h l t t st s t s t s Ts s s s h A h A h Aδ∈ ∈ ∈< = = = = = =  . 
In a pure-strategy normal separating equilibrium, high-type vendors release 
patches earlier than low-type vendors: h ls s< . At any time t  before hs , if no patch has 
yet been released by a vendor, consumers believe that the vendor is of high-type with 
probability δ . At any time t  no later than hs , if a vendor has released a patch, consumers 
believe that it is of high-type. At any time t  no earlier than hs , if no patch has been 
released by a vendor by the time hs , consumers believe that the vendor is of low type. 
The belief update has the characteristic that the earlier a vendor releases a patch, the more 
likely it is of high-type. The reputation of a software product evolves over time as Figure 
4.1 shows. Figure 4.1 (a) illustrates how the reputation of the software product evolves if 
a patch is released before hs . Figure 4.1(b) illustrates the evolution of the reputation if a 





Definition 2: We define a pure-strategy atypical separating equilibrium as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ) ( ){ 00Pr 0 Pr 0 1 Pr 1 0hl l hl h l h t t tt st s t s ss s s s h A h A h Aδ′ ′⎡ ⎞ ⎡ ⎞ ⎡⎣⎟ ⎟⎢ ⎢⎣ ⎠ ⎣ ⎠ ∈ ,∈ , ∈ ,, , < , | = = , | = = , | = = ,  
[ ] ( )( ) }Pr 0 1h ht s T sh A −∈ , | = = . 
In a pure-strategy atypical equilibrium, low-type vendors release patches earlier 
than high-type vendors: l hs s< . At any time t  before ls
′ , if no patch has been released, 
consumers believe that the vendor is of high-type with probability δ . At any time t  
before hs , if a vendor has released a patch, consumers believe that it is of low-type. At 
any time no earlier than ls
′  but before hs , if no patch has yet been released, consumers 
believe that the vendor is of high-type. At any time no earlier than hs , if a vendor has not 
yet released a patch by the time t , which is infinitely close to hs , consumers believe that 
the vendor is of high-type. Different from the normal separating equilibrium, the later a 
vendors releases a patch, the more likely that it is of high-type. The reputation of a 
software product evolves over time as Figure 4.2 shows. Figure 4.2(a) illustrates how the 
reputation of the software product evolves if a patch is released before 'ls . Figure 4.2(b) 
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illustrates the evolution of the reputation if a patch is released between 'ls  and hs . Figure 
4.2(c) illustrates the evolution of the reputation if a patch is released after hs .  
 
 
4.4.3 Normal Separating Equilibrium 
We first consider the case in which high-type vendors have a lower patching cost 
than low-type vendors. That is, h lk k< . Suppose that there is a normal separating 
equilibrium,
s
(a) ls s′≤ (b) l hs s s′ < <
(c) hs s≥
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l l ls s
rdt dt r dt C sr+ + −∫ ∫ ∫      (4.3) 
( )ˆ ˆ ˆ ll lh h l l
krs s r r sr r s
= − + − − −          
At any time before the equilibrium release time for high-type vendors, hs , the 
reputation of a software product is r̂ , which is the expected quality of the software with 
an unpatched vulnerability. The first integration in (4.3) represents the total revenue that 
a low-type vendor makes before hs . At any time after hs , the type of the vendor has been 
revealed as low-type. Before the vendor releases a patch, the reputation of the software is 
ˆlr , and the second integration represents the vendor’s total revenue between hs  and s . 
After the vendor releases a patch, the reputation of the software is recovered to lr , and 
the third integration represents the vendor’s total revenue after s . And the last term is the 
patching cost. 
Using FOC, we can obtain the equilibrium release time and the profit for a low-










( ) ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ2l l h l l l lr r s r k r rπ = − + − −     (4.4) 
In the normal separating equilibrium, low-type vendors choose the release time 
that they will choose in the complete information case. However, they make a higher 
profit than they do in the complete information case. The first two terms of equation (4.4) 
can be rewritten as ( )ˆ ˆh l hsr rδ − , which is greater than zero. This result is different from 
the traditional signaling game, in which low-type players obtain the same payoffs as they 
do in the complete information case. The surplus comes from the fact that it takes time 
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for high-type vendors to produce signals. In the dynamic setting, signals are sent in the 
intermediate stage of the game. Low-type vendors benefit from information asymmetry at 
the early stage of the game.  







rdt r dt C s+ −∫ ∫      (4.5) 
( )ˆ hh h h
h
kr r r s
s
= − − −       
Before a high-type vendor releases a patch, the reputation of its software is r̂ , and 
the first integration of (4.5) is the vendor’s total revenue before hs . After it releases a 
patch, the reputation of its software is hr , and the second integration is its total revenue 
after hs . The last term is the patching cost. Proposition 4.1 characterizes the pure-strategy 
normal separating equilibrium. 
Proposition 4.1  
1. A pure-strategy normal separating equilibrium exists if  
( ) ( )4 4ˆ ˆ
2 ˆ
l lh l h l l l l h l h l h
ll l h
r r r r k r k r r k r kr r
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min{ }n nh h hls s s
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Proposition 4.1 gives the condition under which a pure-strategy normal separating 
equilibrium exists. In the normal separating equilibrium, high-type vendors always 
choose to release a patch earlier than low-type vendors. The analysis shows that high-
type vendors’ release time must be earlier than nhs
∗  to prevent low-type vendors from 
mimicking. In addition, it must fall in the range n nhl hls s
∗ ∗∗⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
,  to guarantee that high-type 
vendors have incentive to differentiate themselves from low-type vendors. Thus, the 
equilibrium release time for high-type vendors must be in the range min{ }n n nhl h hls s s
∗ ∗ ∗∗⎡ ⎤, ,⎣ ⎦ . 
Overall, the sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of a normal separating 
equilibrium is n nhl hs s
∗ ∗< .  
The earlier a vendor releases a patch, the more likely the vendor is of high-type. If 
the optimal release time for high-type vendors in the partially incomplete information 
case, phs , is early enough to prevent low-type vendors from mimicking, high-type 
vendors will choose it as the equilibrium release time. Otherwise, high-type vendors will 
choose the marginal release time, min{ }n nh hls s
∗ ∗∗, . In the normal separating equilibrium, 
low-type vendors’ types are completely revealed after the equilibrium patch release time 
for high-type vendors. Therefore, low-type vendors choose the patch release time that 
they will choose in the complete information case, cls .  
The salvage effect motivates vendors to release patches in a timely manner for 
their reputation and profitability. The signaling effect provides high-type vendors 
additional incentives to patch the vulnerability quickly. The low patching cost enables 
high-type vendors to release patches for the vulnerability earlier and signal their types. 
Although the signaling effect drives low-type vendors to mimic high-type vendors, it is 
not worthwhile for them to do so because of its high patching cost. Low-type vendors 
patch the vulnerability to salvage their damaged reputation. 
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4.4.4 Atypical Separating Equilibrium 
We then consider the case in which low-type vendors’ patching cost is lower than 
that of high-type vendors. That is, l hk k< . We are interested in the existence of an 
atypical separating equilibrium in which low-type vendors choose to release patches 
earlier than high-type vendors. Suppose that there is a pure-strategy atypical separating 
equilibrium 
( ) ( ) ( ) ) ( ){
[ ] ( )( ) }
00
Pr 0 Pr 0 1 Pr 1 0
Pr 0 1 .
hl l h
h h
l h l h t t tt st s t s s
t s T s
s s s s h A h A h A
h A
δ′ ′⎡ ⎞ ⎡ ⎞ ⎡
⎣⎟ ⎟⎢ ⎢⎣ ⎠ ⎣ ⎠
−
∈ ,∈ , ∈ ,
∈ ,
, , < , | = = , | = = , | = = ,
| = =
  






rdt r dt C s+ −∫ ∫     (4.6) 
 ( ) ( )ˆl l lr r r s C s= − − −   
The structure of (4.6) is similar to that of (4.5). Before a low-type vendor releases 
a patch, the reputation of its software product is r̂ , and the first integration of (4.6) 
represents the vendor’s total revenue before s . After it releases a patch, the reputation of 
its software becomes lr  , and the second integration is its total revenue after s . The last 
term is the patching cost. 







h h h hs s
rdt dt r dt C sr
′
′
+ + −∫ ∫ ∫    (4.7) 
( ) ( )ˆˆ ˆ hh hh l h h
h
kr r s r sr r s
′= − − − − −  
The structure of (4.7) is similar to that of (4.3). Before the marginal time ls
′ , the 
reputation of its software product is r̂ , and the first integration of (4.7) represents the 
vendor’s total revenue before ls
′ . After ls
′  but before its equilibrium release time hs , the 
reputation of its software becomes ˆhr  and the second integration represents the vendor’s 
total revenue during that period. After the equilibrium release time hs , the reputation of 
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its software becomes hr . And the third integration represents the vendor’s total revenue 
after hs .  
Using the profit functions we define above, we examine the incentives for high-
type and low-type vendors. Our result shows that there is no pure-strategy atypical 
separating equilibrium. 
Proposition 4.2: There is no pure-strategy atypical separating equilibrium.  
Next we search for a mixed-strategy equilibrium. We define a mixed-strategy 
separating equilibrium in Definition 3.  
Definition 3: We define a mixed-strategy atypical separating equilibrium as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){
( ) ) ( ) [ ] ( )( ) }
0
0
Pr 0 Pr 0
Pr 0 1 Pr 1 0 Pr 0 1
l l l
hhl h h
l h l l l l h t tt s t s s
t t t s Tt st s s s
s s s s s h A h A t
h A h A h A
σ σ δ δ′ ′ ′′⎡ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤




′ ′′ ′′⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ∈ , ∈ ,
∈ ,∈ ,∈ ,
, , ∈ , , < , | = = , | = = ,
| = = , | = = , | = =
.  
Low-type vendors choose the release time following the distribution function lσ  
on l ls s
′ ′′⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, . At any time in the range l ls s
′ ′′⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, , if a vendor has not yet released a patch, 
consumers believe that it is of high-type with probability ( )tδ . The reputation of a 
software product evolves over time as Figure 4.3 shows. Figure 4.3(a) illustrates how the 
reputation of the software product evolves if a patch is released before 'ls . Figure 4.2(b) 
illustrates the evolution of the reputation if a patch is released between 'ls  and 
''
ls . Figure 
4.2(c) illustrates the evolution of the reputation if a patch is released between ''ls  and hs . 
Figure 4.2(d) illustrates the evolution of the reputation if a patch is released after hs .   
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Since delaying patch release increases consumers’ expectation of the vendor 
being of high-quality, ( )tδ  is an increasing function of t . It is worth noticing that high-
type vendors will never randomize the release time in the separating equilibrium. An 
early release will reduce customers’ expectation of the software quality and will also 
incur a higher cost.  
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where ( ) ( ) ( )( )1ˆ ˆh lr t t tr rδ δ= + − .  
For a high-type vendor, its profit function can be represented as  





s s s T
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Proposition 4.3 characterizes the mixed-strategy separating equilibrium.  
Proposition 4.3:  
1. A mixed-strategy atypical separating equilibrium exists if 
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mixed-strategy atypical separating equilibrium.  
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Proposition 4.3 shows the condition under which a mixed-strategy atypical 
separating equilibrium exists. In the mixed-strategy atypical separating equilibrium, low-
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type vendors release patches earlier than high-type vendors. Different from the normal 
separating equilibrium, high-type vendors’ release time must be later than the marginal 
release time, ahs




r r r r− −> , any 
release time for high-type vendors in the range a ahl hls s
∗ ∗∗⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
,  can ensure that high-type 
vendors have an incentive to signal their types. Therefore, the equilibrium release time 
for high-type vendors must fall in the range max a a ah hl hls s s
∗∗ ∗ ∗∗⎧ ⎫
⎨ ⎬
⎩ ⎭
⎡ ⎤, ,⎣ ⎦ . The existence of an 
atypical separating equilibrium requires a ah hls s
∗∗ ∗∗< .  
The later a vendor releases a patch, the more likely it is of high-type. The 
reputation of the software product is weakly increasing. If high-type vendors’ release 
time in the complete information case, chs , is late enough to prevent low-type vendors 
from mimicking, high-type vendors will choose it as the equilibrium release time. 




, . In 
equilibrium, a low-type vendor will choose the release time following the distribution lσ  
over pl lhs s
⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, . Consumers’ belief, ( ) ( ) 2
ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
Pr 1 ll lp h l h llhl
r kr





| = = − , guarantees that low-
type vendors make the same profit over pl lhs s
⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦












σ −− − − −= − , ensure that consumers’ belief update consistent with Bayes’ rule. 
Vendors can be completely separated because the upper bound of the support of lσ , lhs , 
is smaller than hs .  
Since low-type vendors have a lower patching cost than high-type vendors, it is 
easier for low-type vendors to delay the patch release. Considering the signaling effect of 
patching strategies, it is natural to expect that low-type vendors have incentives to 
misrepresent their software quality by mimicking high-type vendors. However, low-type 
vendors suffer a loss in sales in the presence of unpatched vulnerabilities. Thus, they 
choose to patch vulnerabilities as soon as possible because of the salvage effect of 
patching strategies. 
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Example 1: Assume that 1hr = , 12lr = , 12δ = , 12ˆhr = , 14ˆlr = , 116hk =  and 14lk = . The 
sufficient and necessary condition in Proposition 1 holds. Thus, there is a normal 
separating equilibrium. In particular, 1cls = , 110 0 316
p
hs = = . , 1 12 6 0 093
n
hls





∗ = , 1 12 6 0 908
n
hls
∗∗ = + = . , Since 1 1 1 1 1 110 2 6 3 2 6min{ }⎡ ⎤∈ − , , +⎣ ⎦ , 
1
10  is the 
equilibrium release time for high-type vendors and 1 is the equilibrium release time for 
low-type vendors.  
Example 2: Assume that 1hr = , 12lr = , 12δ = , 14ˆhr = , 18ˆlr = , 14hk = , 18lk = . The 
conditions in Proposition 2 hold, there is a mixed-strategy atypical separating 
equilibrium. In particular, 25
p
ls = . 12lhs = , 13 0 5547
c
hs = = . , 
31 1 1 1 1 1




+ + + −∗∗ = = . , ( )
2
5 5 131 1




+ − + −∗ = = . ,










lσ −= − .Since 





+ − + −+ + + −⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪< ,⎨ ⎬
⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
,
31 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 8
3
2
+ + + −  is the 
equilibrium release time for high-type vendors and 25  is the equilibrium release time for 
low-type vendors. 
4.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Patching vulnerabilities after software release is an important stage in the 
software development circle. While quality uncertainty is a fundamental issue in the 
software market, and patching behavior is closely connected to the software quality, the 
strategic aspects of the patching decisions need to be understood. In this paper, we 
explore the information role of patching strategies. We show that vendors can leverage 
the patch release time to signal the quality of their software considering two distinct 
reputation effects, the salvage effect and the signaling effect. We find both the salvage 
effect and the signaling effect can drive a separating outcome.  
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We define and identify two types of separating equilibria. In the normal 
separating equilibrium, high-type vendors patch vulnerabilities more quickly than low-
type vendors. High-type vendors prefer to differentiate themselves from low-type 
vendors in addition to rebuilding the reputation for their software products. The signal 
effect strengthens the salvage effect in providing incentives for vendors to patch quickly. 
In the atypical separating equilibrium, low-type vendors patch vulnerabilities more 
quickly than high-type vendors. The salvage effect provides vendors incentives to patch 
earlier, whereas the signaling effect drives them to delay the patch release. The signaling 
effect weakens the salvage effect. Low-type vendors release patches earlier because the 
salvage effect dominates the signaling effect.  
This paper investigates a special form of signals. Specifically, the patch release 
time is an informative signal. Different from previous literature in which the signal is sent 
at the beginning of the game, the signal in this study is the timing of actions. The update 
of belief takes place over time. We define a new belief profile and identify the 
corresponding separating equilibria.  
To simplify the analysis and derive tractable results, this model has some 
restrictions. For example, hackers are exogenous, users are homogenous, and consumers’ 
patching decisions are exogenous. A more complex model accounting for these aspects 
would change the specifics of the analysis but not the basic insights provided by the 
model. We also abstract from the choice of software quality and patch quality. This 
allows us to focus on strategic issues of timing decisions.  
Future research directions naturally include an empirical study, including 
estimating the correlation between the software quality and the patching cost, identifying 
the reputation determinants, and testing the existence of the separation. It is also valuable 
to extend our approach to other relevant scenarios and gain insight into repairing and 
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reputation building. Besides the software industry, rework and warranties are commonly 
observed in other industries. We will extend our analysis to manufacturing sectors, such 
as automobiles and consumer electronics, considering their distinct features. A potentially 
interesting direction is to explore the tradeoff between reworking in the production 




APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2 
Proof of Lemma 2.1 
Proof: Since certified SPs choose the blocking strategy before they choose the pricing 
and investment strategies, we first analyze certified SPs' pricing and investment strategies 
in each blocking strategy, then derive the blocking strategy. 
(1) Blocking Case: certified SPs completely block the traffic from non-certified SPs 
A customer's expected willingness to pay to certified SP  i  is 
( ) ( )( )2 1 1 )sk jk j
j CP
u VNn VNn n v s x qδ δ
∈
= + − − − −∑
 
The subscript k represents that case  certified SPs completely block the inbound 
traffic from non-certified SPs. From Condition 4, ( )2 1sku VNn VNn VNn VNnδ δ δ= + − = + . 
The price a certified SP can charge is sk skp u= . Certified SP  i ’s profit is 
( ) ( )2 21sk sk ik i ikp n v x q Nn C x tπ δ= − − − − . 
Certified SP's optimization problem is ( ) 2 2121
sk
sk ik i ikx
Max p n v x q Nn x tδ β− − − − . 
Using FOC, we can derive the optimal investment for certified SPs.  
{ }1( ) min 1,sk i ix q Mvqβ δ=  . A certified SP  i 's profit is 
( ) ( )







1 min 1, min 1,
s sb i sb
i i i
VNn VNn v x Nn q C x t
MV MV Mv q Mv q Mv q tβ β
π δ δ
δ δ δ β δ
∗ = + − − − −
= + − − − −
 
(2) Filtering Case: certified SPs selectively filter the traffic from non-certified SPs 
A customer's expected willingness to pay to certified SP i is 
( ) ( )( ) ( )2 2 1 1 ) 1 )sf sf j sf k
j CP k CP
u VNn VNn n v s x q n v y qδ δ
∈ ∉
= + − − − − − −∑ ∑      (A2.1) 
The subscript  f  represents the case that certified SPs selectively filter the traffic 
from non-certified SPs.  sky  denotes the level of effectiveness of certified SPs' protective 
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practices. From Condition 4 and given that only high-type SPs get certified in the 
separating outcome, (A2.1) can be written as ( ) ( )2 1 1sf sf lu VNn y vN nqδ= − − − . The price 
a certified SP can charge is sf sfp u= . Certified SP  i 's profit is 
( ) ( ) ( )2 1 21sf sf sf i sf sfp n v x q Nn C y C x tπ δ= − − − − − . 
Certified SP's optimization problem is 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) 2 2 21 12 22 1 1 1
sf
sf l i i sf sfx
Max VNn y vN nq n v x q Nn y x tδ δ α β− − − − − − − − . Using FOC,  
{ }1( ) min 1,sf i ix q Mvqβ δ∗ = ,  ( )* 1 1sf ly Mvqα δ= − . A certified SP i 's profit is 
{ }( ) { }( ) ( ) ( )( )2 21 1 1 12 22 1 min 1, min 1, 1 1sf i i i l lMV Mvq Mvq Mvq Mvq Mvq tβ β απ δ δ β δ δ δ= − − − − − + − −
 Certified SPs' profit difference between when they selectively filter traffic from 
non-certified SPs and when they completely block traffic from non-certified SPs. 
{ }( ) { }( )
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From Condition 4,  0sf skπ π− < . Certified SPs make a higher profit when they 
completely block the inbound traffic from non-certified SPs. Thus, certified SPs will 
block the traffic from non-certified SPs. 
Proof of Lemma 2.2 
Proof: A customer’s willingness to pay to a non-certified SP is 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) { }( )
( ) ( ) ( ) { }
1
1
ˆ ˆ2 1 1 1 1 min 1,
ˆ1 1 1 min 1,
s sf l h h
sf l h h h
u V V Nn y Nnv q Nnv Mvq q
VNn V Nn y Nnv q Nnv q Nnv q Mvq
β
β
δ δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ δ δ
= + − − − − − −
= + − − − − − +
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Since regulative practices are more effective than protective practices, non-
certified SPs cannot further clean inbound malicious traffic given that certified SPs have 
screened the outgoing traffic. Thus, protective practices can only effectively filter the 
traffic from non-certified SPs, ( )1 lNnv qδ− . 
The price non-certified SPs can charge is ˆ ˆs sp u= . Non-certified SP profit is 
( ) ( ) ( ) { } ( )21 12ˆ ˆ ˆ1 1 1 min 1,s s l h h h sMV MV y Mvq Mv q Mv q Mvq yβπ δ δ δ δ δ α= + − − − − − + − . 
Using FOC, ( ){ }1ˆ min 1, 1s ly Mvqα δ= − . And from Condition 2, ( )1ˆ 1s ly Mvqα δ= − . Thus, a 
non-certified SP’s profit is  
( ) [ ] ( )( ) { }21 12ˆ 1 1 min 1,s l h hVM MV MvE q Mvq Mv q Mvqα βπ δ δ δ δ= + − − + − +  
Proof of Lemma 2.3 
Proof:  The separating outcome requires  ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
ˆ (IC for high-type ISPs)
ˆ (IC for low-type ISPs)
s h s h








Here ( )ˆs hqπ  is the profit a high-type SPs can make if it is non-certified and 
( )s lqπ  is the profit a low-type SPs can make if it is certified. If a high-type SPs deviates 
and does not subscribe to the CS 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) [ ]
( )( )( ) ( ) ( ){ }
2 2
22 2 21 1
2
ˆ 1 2 1 1
1 1 1 min 1, 1
s h
l h h
q V N n V N n MvE q
n vq N n vq N n vq Nα β
π δ δ
δ δ δ
= − + − + −
+ − + + − −
 
Since  1N >>  , we can simply  ( )ˆs hqπ   as follows. 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( )( ) { }21 12ˆ 1 1 min 1,s h l h hq VM MV MvE q Mvq Mv q Mvqα βπ δ δ δ δ= + − − + − +  
If a low-type SP deviates and subscribes to CS, its profit is.  
( ) { }( ) { }( )21 1 121 min 1, min 1,s l l l lq MV MV Mvq Mvq Mvq tβ βπ δ δ δ β δ= + − − − −  
If  lMvqβ δ≥ ,   
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2 22 1 1
2 22 21 1
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If  h lMvq Mvqδ β δ≤ < ,  
86 
( ) [ ]
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
1
2
22 22 1 11 1
2 22




MV MvqMV MvE q
t
Mvq MvqMvq Mvq α βα β
δ δδ β
δ δδ δ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− + −− + −
⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟< ≤
⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ − − −− − − ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 
If  hMvqβ δ<  , 
( ) ( )
( )( )
( ) ( )
( )( )2 21 1 1 12 2 2 2




MV Mvq MV Mvq
t
Mvq Mvqα α
δ δ δ δ
δ β δ β
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− + − − + −
⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟< ≤
⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− − − − − −⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 
No t satisfies both incentive constraints. Thus, when  hMvqβ δ<  , there is no 
separating outcome. 
Overall, when  hMvqβ δ≥  , there is a range of t all of which support separating 
outcome. The optimal fee for the certification provider to induce the separating outcome 
is ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )2 21 12 22 1 1 1l l hMV Mvq Mvq Mvqα βδ δ δ δ− + − − − − . 
Proof of Lemma 2.4 
Proof: A customer's willingness to pay to certificated SP  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )2 1 1 1p ph h pl lu VNn v s x q x q Nnδ δ= − − − + − − . Again, Let v s= , 2pu VNn= . The 
price a SP can charge is  p pp u= . Certificate SP's ( i lq q=  or hq ) profit is  
( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )212 21 2 1pp i p i i p i p i i p iq p v x q q Nn n C x q t VM Mv x q q x q tπ β= − − − − = − − − −  
Using FOC, { } { }1min 1, , ,pci ix Mvq i h lβ= ∈ . And a SP's profit is 
( ) { }( ) { }( ) [ ]21 1 122 1 min 1, min 1, , ,p i i i iq VM Mv Mvq q Mvq t i h lβ βπ β= − − − − ∈  
(1) If a SP deviates and certified SPs completely block the traffic from non-certified 
SPs 
A customer's expected willingness to pay to certified SP i is 
( ) ( ) ( )( )2 1 1pk pk j j
j CP
u V N n n v s x q q
∈
= − − − −∑ . From Condition 4, ( )2 1pku N nV= − . The 
price a certified SP can charge is pk pkp u= .  
Certified SP  i 's profit is ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )2 21 1pk i pk pk i i pkq p n v x q q N n C x tπ = − − − − − . 
Using FOC,  ( ){ }21( ) min 1, 1pk i ix q N n vqβ= − . A certified SP i 's profit is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }( ) ( ){ }( )22 2 2 21 1 122 1 1 1 min 1, 1 min 1, 1pk i i i iq N n V N n vq N n vq N n vqβ βπ β= − − − − − − −
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(2) If a SP deviates and certified SPs accept and filter the traffic from non-certified 
SPs 
A customer's expected willingness to pay to certified SP i is 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )2 1 1 1 )pf pf j j pf l
j CP
u V N n Vn n v s x q q nv y q
∈
= − + − − − − −∑ . From Condition 4, 
( )2 1pf pf lu NnV nv y q= − − . The price a certified SP can charge is pf pfp u=  
Certified SP i 's profit is 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 1 21 1pf i pf pf i i pf pfq p n v x q q N n C y C x tπ = − − − − − − . Using FOC, 
( ){ }21( ) min 1, 1pf i ix q N n vqβ= − ,  21pf ly n vqα=  
A certified SP i 's profit is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }( )
( ){ }( ) ( )
2 2 21
2 22 2 21 1 1
2 2
2 1 1 1 min 1, 1
min 1, 1
pf i i i
i l l
q N n V N n vq N n vq





= + − − − −
− − − + −
 
Certified SPs' profit difference between when they completely block traffic from 
non-certified SPs and when they selectively filter traffic from non-certified SPs. 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }( )
( ){ }( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ){ }( )
( ){ }( )
2 2 21






2 1 1 1 min 1, 1
min 1, 1







N n V N n vq N n vq
N n vq n vq n vq t
N n V N n vq N n vq








⎛ ⎞+ − − − −
⎜ ⎟− = ⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟− − − + −
⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞− − − − −
⎜ ⎟−⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟− − −
⎝ ⎠
 
( ) ( )( )
( )( )




pf pk l l l lN N
l lN




π π− = − + = − +
< − +
 
From Condition 4, 0pf pkπ π− < . Certified SPs make a higher profit when they 
completely block the traffic from non-certified SPs. Thus, certified SPs will block the 
traffic from non-certified SPs. 
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Proof of Lemma 2.5 
Proof:  The pooling outcome requires ( ) ( )( ) ( )
ˆ IC for high-type ISPs
ˆ IC for low-type ISPs
p h p h








A high-type certified SP earns higher profit than a low-type certified SP. The 
profit earned by a non-certified SP is independent of its type. Therefore, if a low-type SP 
subscribes to certification services, a high-type SP also subscribes to it. Thus, the 
incentive constraint for high-type SPs does not bind. In this proof, we only consider the 
incentive constraint for low-type SPs. 
A customer's willingness to pay to a non-certified SP is 
( )





1 min 1, 1 1












⎛ ⎞− − −




The price that a non-certified SP can charge is ˆ ˆp pp u= . The non-certified SP's 
profit is  
{ }( ) ( )( )
{ }( )
( ) ( )
1
22 2 2 1
2
1
1 min 1, 1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ2 1
1 min 1,
l l
p p l p
h h
Mvq q N







⎛ ⎞− − −
⎜ ⎟= − + − + − −⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟+ −
⎝ ⎠
21ˆ p ly n vqα=  
























The optimal fee for the certification provider is the maximal fee the certification 
provider can charge in each case. Thus, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )









h l l l h l
h h h l
h
t VM Mvq Mvq Mvq Mvq Mvq Mvq




δ δ δ δ β
β δ δ β
β β
⎧ ≥ + − + − − − ≥
⎪
⎪ ≥ − + − ≤ <⎨
⎪ ≥ − <⎪⎩
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Proof of Proposition 2.2 
Proof:  Define i si piπ πΔ = − ,  { }1, 2, 3i∈ . 
(1) When  lMvqβ >  
The certification provider's profit in the separating outcome and the pooling 
outcome are as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )2 21 11 2 22 1 1 1s l l hMV Mvq Mvq Mvqα βπ δ δ δ δ δ= − + − − − −  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 2 21 1 11 2 1p h l l l hVM Mvq Mvq Mvq Mvq Mvqβ β βπ δ δ δ δ= + − + − − −  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
2 21 1
2 2
1 1 1 2 2 21 1 1
2




h l l l h
MV Mvq Mvq Mvq
VM Mvq Mvq Mvq Mvq Mvq
α β
β β β
δ δ δ δ δ
π π
δ δ δ δ
⎛ ⎞− + − − − −⎜ ⎟
Δ = − = ⎜ ⎟
− + − + − − −⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
 
When 0δ → ,   
( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
21
2 21 1











δ⎛ ⎞− + −⎜ ⎟Δ = = − < −⎜ ⎟
− + −⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
 
When 1δ → , ( ) ( )( )11 21 0l h h lMv q q Mv q qβΔ = − − + >  
When δ  is large enough, the certification provider has a higher profit in the 
separating equilibrium. When δ  is small, the certification provider prefers the pooling 
equilibrium.  
(2)  When  h lMvq Mvqβ< ≤   
In the separating outcome, the certification provider’s profit is 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )2 21 12 2 22 1 1 1s l l hMV Mvq Mvq Mvqα βπ δ δ δ δ δ= − + − − − −  
The certification provider's profit in the pooling outcome, is  
( )21 12 2p h hVM Mvq Mvqβπ β δ δ= − + −  
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 2 23 3 2 2 21 1 1
2 2
2 2 2 2 21 1 1
2 2
2h l l l
s p
l l h h
Mvq Mvq MV Mvq Mvq
Mvq MV Mvq Mvq Mvq MV
β α α
α β
δ δ δ δ δ
π π
δ δ δ δ δ β
⎛ ⎞+ − − +
⎜ ⎟Δ = − = −
⎜ ⎟+ + − + − + −⎝ ⎠
 
When 0δ →  , 12 2 0MV βΔ = − + <  
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When 1δ →  , ( )21 12 2 2 0h hMvq MvqββΔ = − + >  
When δ  is large enough, the certification provider will induce the separating 
equilibrium if possible. When  δ   is small, the certification provider prefers the pooling 
equilibrium. 
(3)  When  h hMv q Mvqδ β< ≤  
In the separating outcome, the certification provider’s profit is 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )2 21 13 2 22 1 1 1s l l hMV Mvq Mvq Mvqα βπ δ δ δ δ δ= − + − − − −  
The certification provider's profit in the pooling outcome, is 13 2p VMπ β= −  
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2 2 23 3 2 2 21 1 1
2 2
3 2 2 21 1
2 2
2h l l l
s p
l l
Mvq Mvq MV Mvq Mvq
Mvq MV Mvq MV
β α α
α
δ δ δ δ δ
π π
δ δ δ β
⎛ ⎞+ − − +
⎜ ⎟Δ = − = −
⎜ ⎟+ + − + −⎝ ⎠
 
When  0δ →  , 13 2 0MV βΔ = − + <  
When  1δ →  ,  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2 3 2 3 2 2 21 1 1
2 2




1 1 2 1 1





Mvq Mvq MV Mvq
Mvq Mvq MV Mvq MV
M vq vq V
β α α
α
ε ε ε ε
ε ε ε ε β
ε
⎛ ⎞− + − − − − −
⎜ ⎟Δ = −
⎜ ⎟+ − + − + − − − + −⎝ ⎠
= + −
 
If 1 12 3 0h lvq vq V+ − >  , when δ  is large enough, the certification provider induces 
the separating equilibrium; when δ  is small, the certification provider prefers the pooling 
equilibrium. If 1 12 3 0h lvq vq V+ − < , the certification provider always makes higher profit 
in the pooling equilibrium than in the separating equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 2.3 
Proof: The system surplus in the separating equilibrium is 
{ }( ) { }( )






1 min 1, min 1,




MV MV Mv q Mv q Mv q N
S
VM MV MvE q Mvq Mv q Mvq N
β β
α β
δ δ δ β δ δ
δ δ δ δ δ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞+ − − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠= ⎜ ⎟




Let hMv qβ δ>  
( )( )








MV MV Mv q Mv q N
S
VM MV MvE q Mvq Mvq N
β
α β
δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ δ
⎛ ⎞+ − +⎜ ⎟
= ⎜ ⎟
+ + − − + − + −⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
 
The system surplus in the benchmark case is  
[ ] [ ]( )22 2 22 ( ) ( ) NbS V Nn Nn vE q MvE qα= − +  
Define i s bD S S= −  
( )( )
( ) [ ] ( )( ) ( )( )( )
[ ] [ ]( )( )
21
2










MV MV Mv q Mv q N
D S S
VM MV MvE q Mvq Mvq N




δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ δ
⎛ ⎞+ − +⎜ ⎟
= − = ⎜ ⎟
+ + − − + − + −⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
− − +
 When δ ε→ , ( ) ( )( )2 21 11 22 0l l h lD MV Mvq Mvq Mv q q Nα α ε= − − + + <  
When 1δ → , ( ) ( )2 21 11 2 2 0h hD Mvq N Mvq Nβ α= − >  
When  δ δ>  , the separating equilibrium generates a higher system surplus. 
Proof of Proposition 2.4 
Proof: The system surplus of the separating equilibrium is 
( )( )








MV MV Mv q Mv q N
S
VM MV MvE q Mvq Mvq N
β
α β
δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ δ
⎛ ⎞+ − +⎜ ⎟
= ⎜ ⎟
+ + − − + − + −⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
 
The system surplus in the pooling outcome is 
[ ] [ ]( )22 2 22 ( ) ( ) NpS V Nn Nn vE q MvE qβ= − +  
Define  s pD S S= −  ,  { }1, 2i∈   
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 2 23 3 2 21 1 1
2 2
2 2 22 2 2 23 1 1
2 2 2






l h l h l
l l h
s p
h l l l
l l l
Mvq Mvq Mvq Mv q q
MV Mvq Mvq Mvq
D S S






δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ δ
δ
⎛ ⎞+ + −
⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟− − + −
⎜ ⎟= − = −
⎜ ⎟+ − + +⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− + −⎝ ⎠
 
When 0δ → , ( ) ( )2 21 11 2 2 0l lD Mvq Mvqα β= − <  
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When  1δ →  , let 1δ ε= − ,  
( ) ( )( )2 21 11 2 2 2 0h l l lD Mvq Mvq Mvq Mvq MVβ β ε= − − + − <  
Thus, the system surplus in the pooling equilibrium is higher than the system 
surplus in the separating equilibrium.  
 
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3 
Proof of Lemma 3.2  
Proof: The first-order condition (FOC) of (1) with respective to xi is  
( )( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )( )
( ) ( )






















i i in nn
i
xk k
i i in n
U A L C x q x
b k n
U A q C x x
U A L C x q x
b k n



















⎡ ⎤∑⎛ ⎞− + − + −⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠′ ⎢ ⎥−
∑⎢ ⎥⎛ ⎞− − + − −⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤∑⎛ ⎞′ − + − + −⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥= −
∑⎢ ⎥⎛ ⎞′+ − − + − −⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
∑
∑ ( )1 C−
             (A3.1) 
When q L= , the FOC w.r.t. xi can be represented as 
( )( ) ( ) ( )






1; 1 , 1 1
n
i i i i
k
n
i i i i i
k
k kb k n U A q x U A q xn n









⎡ ⎤+′ − − − − − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤+′ ′= − − − + − − − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∑
∑
     (A3.2) 

















− −∑  to substitute ( )( ); 1 , ib k n μ−−  in (A3.1) and 
simplify (A3.1), we have 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )






1 ! 1 1
1 1! 1 !
1 !
1 1! 1 !
n







n n k n kxU A L C x q xn n nk n k









⎛ ⎞− − − − −⎛ ⎞∑− − + − + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−− − ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠







( ) ( )
( )






1 ! 111 1! 2 !
1 !
1 1! 1 !
n







n n kxU A L C x q xn n nk n k









⎛ ⎞− − −⎛ ⎞∑− − + − + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−− − ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠






( ) ( )
( )







1 ! 11 1 1! 2 !
1 ! 111 1 1! 2 !
n




n kk i i
i i i
k
n n kxU A L C x q xn n nk n k




− − − −
=
−
− −+ − −
=
⎛ ⎞− − −⎛ ⎞∑− − + − + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−− − ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠




In the symmetric case,  ( )ixμ μ= , therefore we have   
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )







1 ! 11 1 1! 2 !
1 ! 11 1 1! 2 !
n




n kk i i
i i
k
n n kxU A L C x q xn n nk n k




− −+ − −
=
−
− −+ − −
=
⎛ ⎞− − −⎛ ⎞∑− − + − + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−− − ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠




When  q L= , we have  
( )
( ) ( )
( )







1 ! 11 1 1! 2 !
1 ! 11 1 1! 2 !
n




n kk i i
i i
k
n xkU A L C x xn n nk n k




− −+ − −
=
−
− −+ − −
=
− ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞∑+− − + − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−− − ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠




Therefore, the FOC (A3.1) holds when q L= . Thus, q L=  
Proof of Proposition 3.1 
Proof: Given L=q the FOC of (3.1) w.r.t. xi can be represented as 
( )( ) ( ) ( )






1; 1 , 1 1
n
i i i i
k
n
i i i i i
k
k kb k n U A q x U A q xn n









⎡ ⎤+′ − − − − − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦




The left-hand side (LHS) of (A3.3) can be represented as  
( ) ( )1i i ik kEU A L x EU A L xn nμ ⎡ ⎤+′ − − − − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  
Let i iA x W− = , let l1  and l0 be random variables denoting the expected out-of-
pocket money when firm i has a loss or no loss, respectively. Thus, 1 1 kl Ln
+=  and 
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0
kl Ln= . Let 1
il  and 0il  be the ith moment of l1 and l0, respectively. Then, with n 
members in a risk pool, we have  
( ) ( )1 11 1 1 iE l n n Lμ− ⎡ ⎤= + −⎣ ⎦  
( ) ( )1 10 1 iE l n n Lμ−= −  
( ) ( ) ( )( )2 2 2 21 1 3 1 1 2i iE l n n n n Lμ μ− ⎡ ⎤= + − + − −⎣ ⎦  
( ) ( ) ( )( )2 2 2 20 1 1 2i iE l n n n n Lμ μ− ⎡ ⎤= − + − −⎣ ⎦  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )3 3 2 3 31 1 7 1 6 1 2 1 2 3i i iE l n n n n n n n Lμ μ μ− ⎡ ⎤= + − + − − + − − −⎣ ⎦  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )3 3 2 3 30 1 3 1 2 1 2 3i i iE l n n n n n n n Lμ μ μ− ⎡ ⎤= − + − − + − − −⎣ ⎦  
Then  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )









EU W l E U W l U W l U W l U W
E U W l U W l U W l U W
μ
μ
⎡ ′ ′′ ′′′ ⎤− = − + −⎣ ⎦
⎡ ′ ′′ ′′′ ⎤+ − − + −⎣ ⎦
 
Using Taylor Expansion, the LHS of the FOC in (A2.1) can be transformed as 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 2 2 3 30 1 0 1 0 1/ 2 / 6i U W E l E l U W E l E l U W E l E lμ ⎡ ⎤′ ′ ′′ ′′′− − − + −⎣ ⎦  
Since 0μ′ < , ( ) ( )2 20 1 0E l E l− < , ( ) ( )3 30 1 0E l E l− < , ( ) 0U W′′ < , ( ) 0U W′′′ > , The 
LHS of (A3.3) satisfies that  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 10 1i i i i iLHS U W E l E l U W L n U W L U A x Lμ μ μ μ′ ′ ′⎡ ⎤′ ′ ′ ′ ′⎡ ⎤< − = − < − = − −⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦  
Also, the right-hand side (RHS) of (A3) 




1; 1 , 1 1
1
n
i i i i i
k
i
k kb k n U A q x U A q x Cn n





⎡ ⎤+′ ′− − − + − − − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
′> − −
∑  
Therefore, we have 







′ < −  
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Thus, the security investment if the case of RPA is less than that in the case of 
commercial insurance. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3.2 
Proof: We first show that when n is sufficiently large, firms do not form a single risk 
pool. To see that, note when n ∞, if firms form a single risk pool, each firm’s expected 
utility is  
( ) ( )1P U A L xμΠ = − −      (A3.4) 
where μ is the equilibrium breach probability and x is the equilibrium security 
investment. The FOC of (A3.4) is ( )( )1 0U A L x Cμ′ − − − < . Therefore, x=0. In other 
words, firms do not invest at all. Thus, 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )1 0P C C CU A L U A L xxμ μΠ = − Π − −< =    (A3.5) 
(A3.5) indicates that when n is sufficiently large, forming a single risk pool does 
not generate higher expected utilities for firms than using commercial insurance.  
Note that when n firms form n/m* risk pools, in symmetric equilibrium, all firms 
invest at the same level, regardless of which risk pool they participate in. Therefore, each 
firm’s expected utility is ( )*P mΠ . Since ( )*P CmΠ Π> , firms will form multiple risk 
pools instead of using commercial insurance.     
Proof of Lemma 3.3 
Proof: The first-derivative of firm i’s expected utility w.r.t Ii  
( )( ) ( ) ( )






; 1 , 11
1 ; 1 , 1
n
i i




i i i i i i i
k
n kxb k n U A L C x q I I xn n
xkb k n U A q C x I xn n
μ μ μ μ









⎛ ⎞− −⎛ ⎞∑′= − − + − + + − − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠





( ) ( )( )










i i i i in nn
i i i
xk k
i i i in n
U A L C x q I I x
b k n











⎛ ⎞∑⎛ ⎞′ − + − + + − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟= − −
⎜ ⎟∑⎛ ⎞′− − + − − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
∑  
The second-derivative of firm i’s expected utility w.r.t  Ii is  
( ) ( )( )


















i i i i i in n
k




U A L C x q I I x















⎛ ⎞∑⎛ ⎞′′− − + − + + − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟ <
⎜ ⎟∑⎛ ⎞′′+ − + − − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
∑
 
When  iI L q≤ −  ,  we have 
( )1n k k
in nL q I q






i i i i i
i i
i i i i
n kxU A L C x q I I xn n





⎛ ⎞− −⎛ ⎞∑′ − + − + + − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞∑′− − + − − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
>
 
Therefore, the first-derivative of firm i’s expected utility w.r.t Ii is positive, and 
thus firm i will choose Ii=L-q. 
Proof of Proposition 3.3 
Proof: In the symmetric case, the FOC of (3.2) w.r.t. q, by the Envelop Theorem,  
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )















i i i i i
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k k xb k n U A q x L q x Cn n q
xk kb k n U A q x L q x Cn n q
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⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞+ + ∂′− − − − − − + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠




Then when q=0 and i iμ μ μ−= = , the FOC can be represented as  
97 














; 1 , ; 1 , 11
1; 1 ,
1 ; 1 ,
















k x xnC kb k n b k n Cn n q n q
xn kb k n Cn n q
xn kC b k nn q n
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∂⎛ ⎞−= − − −⎜ ⎟∂⎝ ⎠
∂−= − − −
∂
































Next, we derive ix q−∂ ∂ .  
Note that given q and I, in the symmetric case, the FOC w.r.t. xi satisfies that 
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Therefore, we have  
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Moreover, tedious algebra shows that  
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 and firms have an incentive to choose a q>0, i.e., use RPA.  
Proof of Proposition 3.4  
Proof: The main logic of the proof for this proposition is as follows. If there exists a case 
where firms form multiple pools to retain an amount qm of risks, invest at xm, and use 
commercial insurance to cover L- qm,  then we can also find a corresponding case where 
firms form a single pool to retain an amount q < qm of risks and invest at the same level 
xm. With the same investment level but a single pool, firms are better off since they retain 
fewer risks within the single pool.   
Consider two cases. First, firms form m pools and the size of each pool is J=n/m 
(suppose that n can be divided by m). Suppose the firm’s optimal security investment in 
this case is xm, and the amount of loss covered by the risk pool is qm, where m stands for 
“multiple pools”. Also, denote xc as the firm’s equilibrium security investment when only 
commercial insurance is used. Therefore, we must have xm< xc. To see that, let Пc(xc) 
denote a firm’s expected utility when firms only use commercial insurance and invest at 
xc, let Пc(xm) denote a firm’s expected utility when firms only use commercial insurance 
and invest at xm, let Пm(xm, qm) denote a firm’s expected utility when firms use the risk 
pools to cover qm and invest at xm. Therefore, the expected utility of a firm, say firm i, in 
the case of multiple pools is  
( ) ( )( )
( )( )











U A q L q x
x q b k J







⎛ ⎞− − − −
⎜ ⎟Π = − ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ − − − − −⎝ ⎠
∑  
Since xc is higher than optimal investment level (i.e., overinvestment), if xm> xc, 
we must have Пc(xm)< Пc(xc). Recall that when firms only use commercial insurance, 
they always buy full insurance. Since when using RPA, firms retain part of risks and do 
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not have the full insurance, we must have Пm(xm, qm)< Пc(xm).  Therefore, if xm> xc, 
Пm(xm, qm)< Пc(xm)< Пc(xc) and firms are worse off by using RPA. In other words, if 
firms use multiple risk pools in equilibrium, we must have xm< xc.  
Next, let Пs(xs, qm) denote a firm’s expected utility when firms use a single risk 
pool to cover qm (and use commercial insurance to cover L-qm) and invest at the optimal 
level xs. In the equilibrium, we must have xs<xm.  This is because the single risk pool has 
more members to share the risks and therefore, the moral hazard problem is more severe. 
To see that, note that if firms form a single pool, the expected utility of a firm in the 
symmetric equilibrium is  
( ) ( )( )
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∑  
Suppose firms invest at xm, following the same approach as in Lee and Ligon 
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∑  
Let ( )m mA L q x Wμ− − − = , firm i’s expected utility can be represented as  
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Let l1 and l0 be random variables denoting the expected out-of-pocket money 
when firm i has a loss or no loss, respectively. Let Let l1 i and l0 i be the ith moment of l1 
and l0, respectively. Then, with n members in a risk pool, we have  
( ) ( )1 11 1 1 mE l n n qμ− ⎡ ⎤= + −⎣ ⎦  
( ) ( )1 10 1 mE l n n qμ−= −  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )22 2 21 1 3 1 1 2 mE l n n n n qμ μ− ⎡ ⎤= + − + − −⎣ ⎦  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )22 2 20 1 1 2 mE l n n n n qμ μ− ⎡ ⎤= − + − −⎣ ⎦  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )33 3 2 31 1 7 1 6 1 2 1 2 3 mE l n n n n n n n qμ μ μ− ⎡ ⎤= + − + − − + − − −⎣ ⎦  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )33 3 2 30 1 3 1 2 1 2 3 mE l n n n n n n n qμ μ μ− ⎡ ⎤= − + − − + − − −⎣ ⎦  
Then  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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Using Taylor Expansion, the FOC can be transformed as 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
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⎡ ⎤= − + − − − + −⎣ ⎦
(A3.6) 
Also, using Taylor Expansion, the RHS of (A3.6) can be transformed as  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
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⎡ ⎤= − + − + + − − + −⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞
= − + + − − + −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟
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The LHS of (A3.6) can be transformed as 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )( )
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Therefore, the FOC can be transformed as  
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⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞
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⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
 (A3.7) 
For expositional purpose, we represent the FOC in (A3.7) as 
n nLHS RHS=  
Similarly, when firms form multiple risk pools with a size of j, the FOC for firm i 
is 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )( )





' '' 1 2 1 2
'
''' 1 6 1 3 1 2 6




U W j q U W j j q
U W j j j j q
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⎡ ⎤− + −⎢ ⎥
− ⎢ ⎥
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⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞
= − + + − − + −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
 (A3.8) 
For expositional purpose, we represent the FOC in (A3.8) as 
j jLHS RHS=  
Note that  n j
n LHS LHS
j
<  and j n
nRHS RHS
j
< . Therefore, when xm satisfies the 
FOC j jLHS RHS= , it will make n nLHS RHS< . Since x
s satisfies that n nLHS RHS= , we 
must have xs<xm.  
By assuming that the utility function U(.) is well-behaved, xs(q) (i.e., the optimal 
investment xs as a function of q) is a continuous function of q. Therefore, there exists a 
q<qm such that xs(q)=xm. In other words, firms can choose a q<qm to make the investment 
in a single pool equal to xm. In this case, firms’ investments in a single pool are equal to 
their investments in multiple pools but firms retain fewer risks in the single pool than in 
multiple pools. Consequently, firms’ expected utilities in the case of a single pool are 
higher than their utilities in the case of multiple pools.  
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Proof of Proposition 3.5 
Proof: When n approaches to the infinite, the number of firms who have the security 
breach approaches nμ  (Law of large number). And the expected loss shared by the pool 
member approaches to qμ . The risk pool provides full coverage to all the members and 
the shared loss is the “premium equivalence” that each pool member pays. We can 





xU A q C x L q x
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μ μ− −
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The expected utility function has the same form as that in the case of commercial 
insurance and the maximum profit can be achieved if all firms invest at the optimal. 
Next we examine a firm's investment decision. The first-derivative of firm i’s 
expected utility w.r.t  ix , ( ) ( )( )1 01
i i
i i i i i
xU A q C x L q x C L q
n
μ μ μ− −






μ −′ = −
−
 
With a single risk pool, firms can always collectively choose a q  to induce the 
optimal security investment where for any firm i, the investment xi satisfies that 
( ) 1i Lxμ′ = − . To achieve that, q must satisfy that q CL= .  
Proof of Overinvestment in the Case of Negative Externality 
Firm i’s expected utility is  




x x nμ μ
−
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞
= + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
∑  
FOC w.r.t. I , Ii=L. Firm i’s expected utility is ( )i iU A L xμ− −  





−⎛ ⎞′ − = −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
∑  
104 
In the symmetric case, where i ix x−= , the investment xi satisfies that  
( ) 12ix Lμ′ = −  
Next, consider the socially optimal case. Let x represents the socially optimal 
investment in the symmetric case. With the full insurance, the total expected utility of all 
firms is  
( ) ( )i i
i
U A L x nU A L xμ μ− − = − −∑  
FOC w.r.t.  x is ( )( ) ( )( )1 0U A x L x x Lμ μ′ ′− − − − = . Therefore, the socially 
optimal investment x satisfies that ( ) 1x Lμ′ = −  
Note that since 1 1
2L L− > −
, we have that xi > x and the firm I overinvests in xi. 
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That is,  iu x iu yL L Cμ η′ ′= +  
where subscript “u” represents underinvestment case. Given 0μ′′ > ,  it is easy to 
see that iux  increases in C and iuy  decreases in C. 
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FOCs in the first-best case satisfy,  
2io x io yL Lμ η′ ′=  
 where subscript “o” represents the first-best case. 
Given 2iu y io yL C Lη η′ ′+ > , we can conclude that iu iox x>  and hence iu ioy y< . 
 
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 4 
Proof for Proposition 4.1 
Proof::  If a low-type vendor mimics a high-type vendor, its profit can be represented as 




+ − −  
The incentive constraint for a low-type vendor can be represented as  
( ) ( )ˆ ˆ2 1ˆ ˆ ll lh h l l l h h h
h
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− + − − > + − −  
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We can derive the marginal release times which prevent the low-type vendor from 
mimicking as follows.  
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Next we consider the incentive constraint of a high-type vendor. If a high-type 
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Using FOC, we can derive the release time and the profit for a high-type vendor if 
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The incentive constraint for a high-type vendor can be represented as  
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We can derive the marginal release times as  
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hl h hls s s
∗ ∗∗≤ ≤  
Thus, the equilibrium release time for high-type vendors should satisfy 
min{ }n n nh hl h hls s s s
∗ ∗ ∗∗⎡ ⎤∈ , ,⎣ ⎦ . The sufficient and necessary condition under which a normal 
separating equilibrium exists is n nhl hs s
∗ ∗≤ . That is,  
( ) ( )4 4ˆ ˆ
2 ˆ
l lh l h l l l l h l h l h
ll l h
r r r r k r k r r k r kr r
r k kr










If min{ }p n n nh hl h hls s s s
∗ ∗ ∗∗⎡ ⎤∈ , ,⎣ ⎦ , 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }0 0Pr 0 Pr 1 1 Pr 0 0p p p hh h hp c p ch l h l t t st s t s t s Ts s s s h A h A h Aδ⎡ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤⎟⎢ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎠ ⎣ ⎦⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎡ ⎤⎝ ⎠ ∈ , ∈ , ∈ ,⎣ ⎦, , < , | = = , | = = , | = =  is 
the normal separating equilibrium.  
If min{ }p n nh h hls s s
∗ ∗∗> , , 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }0 0Pr 0 Pr 1 1 Pr 0 0n n n hh h hn c n ch l h l t t st s t s t s Ts s s s h A h A h Aδ⎡ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤⎟⎢ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎠ ⎣ ⎦⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎡ ⎤⎝ ⎠ ∈ , ∈ , ∈ ,⎣ ⎦, , < , | = = , | = = , | = =  is 
the normal separating equilibrium where min{ }nh h hls s s
∗ ∗∗= ,   
 
Proof of Proposition 4.2 
Proof: Suppose that pl ls s
′ = . That is, the marginal belief is equal to the release time for a 
low-type vendor in the partially incomplete information case. We can derive the 











r k r rπ π
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= = − −
 
Since low-type vendors reveal their type right after they release patches, its 
release time and profit are exactly the same as that in the partially incomplete information 
case.  










h l ls s
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= − + − + −
∫ ∫ ∫
 
Using FOC, we can obtain the equilibrium release time and the profit for a low-
type vendor who deviates from the equilibrium path. 
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( ) ( )
ˆ















−= − − − −
−
 
The incentive constraint should satisfied 
( ) ( ) ( )ˆˆˆ ˆ2 2 ˆˆ
h
hl l l l l l l l
l
rrr k r r r k r r k r rr r
−
− − > − − − −
−
 
 ( )( )2ˆ0 ˆhl lr r rr> − − −     (A4.1) 
which is impossible to hold. The belief and vendors’ strategies are not consistent.  
Suppose that ls
′ ∈  )0 ls⎡⎢⎣ , , a low-type vendor’s profit by choosing any release time 
in the range 0 ls
′⎡ ⎞
⎟⎢⎣ ⎠
,  is less than lπ . If the vendor choose the release time lhs , its profit is 
higher than lhπ . From (A4.1), lh lπ π> . The vendor will not release patch at any time 
within )0 ls⎡⎢⎣ , . The belief and vendors’ strategies are not consistent.  
Suppose that )l lh hs s s′ ⎡⎢⎣∈ , . The vendor obtains the maximal profit at ls′  in the 
range l hs s
′⎡ ⎞
⎟⎢⎣ ⎠
, . But the profit is lower than what it can get by choosing ls . The belief and 
vendors’ strategy are not consistent.  
Overall, we conclude that there is no pure strategy equilibrium.  
Proof of Proposition 4.3 
Proof:: Suppose that the equilibrium release time for low-type vendors follows the 
distribute ( )l tσ  on l ls s′ ′′⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦, . ( ) ( )Prl lt s tσ = ≤ . Given ( )l tσ , we can derive consumers’ 




=   
From ( )tδ , we can obtain the distribution of the release time lσ . For notation 
simplicity, we use a  to represent 0tA =  
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Given ( )Pr 1a h| = . ( ) ( )Pr 1 la l tσ| = − . ( )Pr h δ= . ( )Pr 1l δ= − .  







    (A4.2) 
And the instantaneous reputation can be represented as  
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )1ˆ ˆh lr t t tr rδ δ= + −     (A4.3) 
Next we derive the reputation function which leads to a equal profit for low-type 
vendors on l ls s
′ ′′⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, . If it chooses the release time  t , a low-type vendor’s profit function 
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Differentiate (A4.4) w.r.t. t  
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From (A4.3)  
( ) ( )( ) 21ˆ ˆ lh l l
kt t rr r t
δ δ+ − = −  
( ) ( ) 2
ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ll l
h l h l
r krt





′= , ( )tδ  should be δ , 
( ) 2
ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ll l
h l h l
r kr















′′= , ( )tδ  should be 1, 
( ) 2
ˆ1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ll l
h l h l
r kr














From (A4.2)  
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( )l tσ  satisfies 0pl lsσ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ =  and ( ) 1lhsσ = .  
Therefore, we suppose the belief profile as  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){
) ( ) [ ] ( )( ) }
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ˆ
ˆ ˆ0 ˆ ˆ
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Pr 0 Pr 0 Pr 0 1
Pr 1 0 Pr 0 1
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t t tt s sr r tt s t s s r r
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− ∈ ,−∈ , ∈ ,
∈ ,∈ ,
= | = = , | = = − , | = = ,
| = = , | = =
 
The low-type vendor’s profit is ( )ˆ2l l lr k r r− −   
Following the analysis in proof for proposition 2, we can also obtain that the low-
type vendor will not deviate to any time in the range 0 pls
⎡ ⎞
⎟⎢⎣ ⎠
,  or ( )lh hs s, .  
And a high-type vendor’s equilibrium profit can be represented as  
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If a low-type vendor mimics the high-type vendor by choosing the equilibrium 
release time for high-type vendors, its profit can be represented as  
( ) ( )
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Then a low-type vendor’s incentive constraint can be represented as  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ2 2 2ˆ ˆ lh hl l l l l l l h h h
h
kr k r r k r k r r r r sr r s
− − ≥ − − − + + − −  
( ) ( )2 ˆ ˆ lh hl l l h h h
h
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− − − + − + ≥  
We can derive the marginal release times which prevent low-type vendors from 
mimicking high-type vendors as follows.  
( ) ( ) ( )
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Next we check whether a high-type vendor will choose a time in the range 0 lhs⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦, .  
Consider the belief profile  
( ) ( ) ( ) ) ( ){
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lhr r r rs− −> = .  
The release time that a high-type vendor chooses with the belief profile μ  is no 
earlier than that with μ′ . lhs  will be the release time that a high-type vendor choose in the 
range 0 lhs⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦,  with belief μ . Consequently, this case merges to the next case we consider. 
Consider the case that the high-type vendor chooses an earlier release time in the 
range )lh hs s⎡⎢⎣ , , we can derive its release time and profit as follows. 
( ) ( )
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( ) ( ) ( )ˆ2 2 2ˆ ˆh hhl l l l l l h lk r k r r r k rr rπ = − − − + − −  
Since l hk k< , hl lhs s>  .  
Then the high-type vendor’s incentive constraint can be represented as
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ2 2 2 2 2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆhh h h hl l l l h h h l l l l l h l
h
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 ( ) ( )2ˆ ˆhh hh h h l h l
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We can derive the marginal release times as 
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A high-type vendor’s equilibrium release time must satisfy 
a a
hl h hls s s
∗ ∗∗≤ ≤  
Overall, the equilibrium release time must satisfy max a a ah h hl hls s s s
⎡ ⎤∗∗ ∗ ∗∗⎧ ⎫
⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥
⎩ ⎭⎣ ⎦
∈ , , .  
The existence of an atypical separating equilibrium requires a ah hls s
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If maxc a a ah h hl hls s s s
⎡ ⎤∗∗ ∗ ∗∗⎧ ⎫
⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥
⎩ ⎭⎣ ⎦
∈ , , , 
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